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Considering the limitations of the existing centralized power infrastructure, research interests 
have been directed to decentralized smart power systems constructed as networks of 
interconnected microgrids. Therefore, it has become critical to develop secure and efficient 
energy trading mechanisms among networked microgrids for reliability and economic mutual 
benefits. Furthermore, integrating blockchain technologies into the energy sector has gained 
significant interest among researchers and industry professionals. Considering these trends, the 
work in this thesis focuses on developing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading models to facilitate 
transactions among microgrids in a multiagent network. Price negotiation mechanisms are 
proposed for both islanded and grid-connected microgrid networks. To enable a trusted 
settlement of electricity trading transactions, a two-stage blockchain-based settlement consensus 
protocol is also developed. Simulation results have shown that the model has successfully 






This chapter will include a discussion of the background and motivation which inspired 
the undertaking of this research. Additionally, this chapter includes an extensive literature review 
of the topic, and a summary of the thesis scope and contributions. 
1.1 Background 
For decades, energy consumers have relied on the large-scale power grid to supply 
electrical power for their homes and businesses. The power grid has traditionally consisted of 
utility-owned and operated electric power generation plants connected to high voltage 
transmission lines delivering electricity up to hundreds of miles away from the power source. 
The highly centralized nature of these power grids has been a significant concern for system 
reliability and resiliency, where a single-equipment failure can have extensive effects on the rest 
of the grid, leading to localized power disruptions, generation outages, and even large-scale 
blackouts [1]. Additionally, the power grid has traditionally relied on conventional, non-
renewable energy sources such as coal and natural gas. These fossil fuels, in addition to being a 
depleting resource, have been shown to contribute greatly to environmental pollution and 
growing crisis of climate change [2]. 
In recent years, the concept of a smart grid has begun to emerge which aims to alleviate 
and eliminate many of the concerns of the traditional power grid. Smart Grid is the term for the 
next generation of the power grid which is currently being researched, developed, and deployed 
around the world. The Smart Grid includes many technological upgrades and additional control 
features to the grid including smart meter technology, smart appliances, and a focus on 
renewable energy and other energy efficient resources [3]. The goal of the Smart Grid is to 
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optimize the economic and operational efficiency of the grid by improving grid reliability and 
demand response flexibility. Because of this emphasis on efficiency and integration of renewable 
energies, it is common for the future smart grid to be imagined as a system of interconnected 
smart microgrids [4]. IEEE standard 1547.4 has confirmed that representing large power grids by 
a group of interconnected microgrids significantly enhances the reliability, resiliency, and 
sustainability of the network [5]. Thus, significant attention has been paid to the concept of 
networked microgrid operation in recent years.  
Microgrid is defined by the US Department of Energy as “a group of interconnected 
loads and distributed energy resources within clearly defined electrical boundaries that acts as a 
single controllable entity with respect to the grid. A microgrid can connect and disconnect from 
the grid to enable it to operate in both grid-connected or island mode” [5]. Microgrid applications 
have been developing steadily over the past few years and deployment of microgrids are 
anticipated to increase even more in the near future, especially with an increasing interest in the 
use of smart grid technology.  
The most important aspect of any power grid operation is the ability to maintain 
generation-demand balance at all times. However, due to the intermittent nature of the renewable 
energy sources present in the microgrids and the unique energy demands of each grid, all 
microgrids will have different energy profiles. It is an essential principle of any grid operation to 
maintain a generation-demand balance. However, for any given interval in a 24-hour day, some 
microgrids will be experiencing energy deficit conditions where generation is less than demand, 
while others may be experiencing energy surplus conditions where generation is greater than 
demand. Therefore, in order to maintain real-time balance of local power generation and 
demand, microgrids may seek to establish energy trading coalitions to share energy resources. 
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Coalition formation and the energy trading mechanism used to assure adequate power sharing 
among networked microgrids are crucial elements to the success of the interconnected microgrid 
network. Energy trading helps to ensure generation-demand imbalance is mitigated as much as 
possible based on available resources while also minimizing microgrid operation costs by 
maximizing the economic efficiency of the microgrid network. 
  Centralized energy trading models are relatively simplistic and convenient; however 
they are hard to scale for a large number of entities. Furthermore, centralized trading schemes 
make networks highly susceptible to cyber-attacks [6]. Because of these drawbacks, the 
emergence of Blockchain and the great amount of attention given to it has led to a tremendous 
amount of interest in using the technology within information infrastructures to assure secure and 
decentralize energy trading [6]. In the U.S., the Brooklyn Microgrid project is an example of a 
first generation successful peer-to-peer blockchain system operating through smart meters, where 
prosumers are able to trade energy based on pre-determined bid prices [7].   
As previously noted, the concept of blockchain is becoming a popular choice for secure 
transactions in decentralized networks. First proposed in 2008, a blockchain is a simple growing 
list of public records known as blocks which are securely linked to one another to form a chain. 
The original application of the blockchain was to provide a distributed public transaction record 
for the Bitcoin cryptocurrency, but the concept has been adapted to be used in any case where 
transactional security is a concern. The primary advantage of the blockchain is its distributed, 
decentralized structure, which allows for direct peer-to-peer interaction without the concern of a 
potentially compromised central entity. The blockchain also employs a consensus method, 
whereby blocks must be validated by varying means before being appended to the blockchain. 
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  Due to the immutability of the blockchain record and the consensus methods used to 
validate information appended to the chain, blockchain is a perfect candidate for tracking 
financial transaction records [8]. These blockchains are constructed as digital ledgers, where 
each block contains the details of a financial transaction. The data contained in a block includes 
the identification of the parties participating in the transaction, the amount of goods being 
transacted, the timestamp of the execution of the transaction, and an alpha-numeric string called 
a hash, which is taken from the previous block. This data is input into a hashing function, 
generating a new and unique hash which is appended to the block, separate from the transaction 
data. All information is then updated synchronously to the entire network so that each peer (node 
in the network) keeps a record of the same ledger. The next block includes the hash from the 
previous block as part of its data and generates a new hash, which is then used by the next block. 
Therefore, the blocks are chained together by these uniquely generated hashes. If any of the data 
in a chained block is modified, the hash associated with that block will change, no longer 
matching the hash used in the next block and thereby breaking the chain. Because of its 
consensus method, integrity of the data recorded in the ledger can be guaranteed without a 
trusted third party [9]. Various consensus algorithms have been developed such as Proof of Work 
(PoW), Proof of Stake (PoS), Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS), Ripple Protocol Consensus 
Algorithm (RPCA) and AlgoRand [9]. The consensus algorithm is the most important factor of 
the entire blockchain system, not only because it is the primary method of blockchain security, 






1.2 Literature Review 
In the existing literature, numerous models have been developed for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) 
energy trading with and without considering the integration of blockchain technology, which can 
be classified into three main areas: game theory models [10] – [13], auction models [14] – [17], 
and analytical models [18] – [20]. Researchers in [10] propose a novel game-theoretic model for 
P2P energy trading using direct interaction between prosumers with a particular consideration for 
demand response capability and privacy. Price negotiations are modeled as a non-cooperative 
game, with a novel iterative algorithm developed to reach price equilibrium. The work proposed 
in [11] suggests a strategy for energy storage allocation utilizing a Stackelberg game. In this 
strategy, each participant submits an initial bid price which is evaluated by a central, third-party 
participant. The third party then calculates a target price between the minimum and maximum 
bid prices which seeks to maximize the average cost savings among participants. After the 
selected target price is proposed, participants may adjust the amount of energy storage allocation 
they are willing to purchase, which would in turn affect the target price calculation. The target 
price and participant energy storage amounts are continuously updated until an equilibrium is 
reached where all bids are finalized and payments are exchanged. A primary drawback of the 
proposed strategy is the requirement of a centralized entity to control price adjustments for 
trading. Additionally, the economic efficiency is not maximized for each participant. The model 
proposed in [12] formulates a cooperative game to solve energy trading with bilateral decision 
making. In this model, buyers and sellers determine their maximum and minimum acceptable 
costs and maximum and minimum acceptable payoff. The game is solved when an appropriate 
bilateral price is determined for both parties. The efficiency of the model is shown for energy 
trading between single seller single buyer and single seller multiple buyers; however, the model 
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is not extended to scenarios which consider multiple sellers in the marketplace. The work in [13] 
proposes a Stackelberg game-based dynamical pricing strategy for energy sharing. A central 
trading operator sets the buying and selling prices for the microgrid, while the energy prosumers 
are able to determine their level of energy consumption from the microgrid and from the utility.  
Researchers in [14] propose an energy market auction for a community microgrid. The 
community microgrid establishes trading between its prosumers in an effort to purchase energy 
at a price below the utility price. The utility participates as an infinite energy source in the 
market, therefore excess generated power in the microgrid will remain unsold if it cannot beat 
the utility price. Additionally, the proposed trading market is conditioned for noniterative 
bidding, which does not allow for energy prices and bids to be dynamically updated to encourage 
trading. In [15], an iterative double auction price adjustment mechanism is proposed in an effort 
to maximize social welfare. A third-party energy broker entity acts as an auctioneer, determining 
the execution of energy trades based on buying and selling prices submitted by participants. In 
this way, the third-party entity ultimately determines the final trading price and amount. 
Researchers in [16] propose a continuous double auction-based electricity market utilizing a 
predictive trading optimization model. In this strategy, an optimization problem which 
determines optimal grid operation is integrated into the auction model in order to optimize the 
bidding behaviors of buyers and sellers. This optimized auction model relies on market pricing 
predictions based on historical transaction data.  The work in [17] proposes a multiagent method 
for energy trading utilizing a strict reverse auction bidding scheme. In this method, an aggregator 
acts as a central entity interfacing with generation entities in the microgrid which bid to fulfill the 
microgrid demand with the aggregator having control over the selection of bids. If the available 
energy supply is higher than the demand, the aggregator lowers the purchasing price and accepts 
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updated bids from willing participants. This process continues until only one participant remains 
and the trade is executed at the final price. The primary drawback of this work is also the 
reliance on a central trade control entity.  
The work in [18] develops a P2P linear programming trading model for applications in 
decentralized and centralized storage energy markets. The model is designed as a multi-energy 
management strategy with a goal to minimize electricity costs in the trading community. The 
authors admit that price determination is highly dependent on the assumed consumption costs, 
which in the proposed modeled are determined from grid prices. Authors in [19] propose an 
optimization model for the operation of PV systems in the context of P2P energy trading. The 
proposed model is designed as a mixed integer linear programming model used to optimize 
operational decisions of a distributed energy market which allows P2P energy trading. In this 
way, the pricing mechanism for energy trading is directly incorporated in the optimization 
problem. Research in [20] proposes a dynamical pricing model for energy sharing considering 
the supply and demand ratio of shared PV energy. Prosumers calculate desired prices in an effort 
to minimize economic and inconvenience costs. Buyers attempt to match their prices to the seller 
price, with both updating their prices iteratively based on the cost function until converging on 
their finalized prices. If prices do not match, the excess demand is satisfied by the utility. None 
of the trading models proposed in [10] – [20] consider costs associated with islanded microgrid 
operation, such as energy curtailment and load shedding. Additionally, the existing models fail to 
consider other factors which influence the buying and selling prices such as spinning reserve and 
energy storage costs.  
In terms of integrating blockchain technology, few studies have focused on developing 
decentralized energy trading using blockchain technology [21] – [25]. For instance, the work in 
8 
 
[21] proposes a two-layer algorithm for blockchain-based energy trading negotiation and 
transaction settlement among grid connected networked prosumers. The first layer is a contract 
chain, which contains data related to the energy transaction. The second layer is a ledger chain, 
which tracks the trading balance of the microgrid network. Because the data in these two chains 
directly influence one another, the immutability of their records is further ensured by a high 
frequency verification mechanism between corresponding blocks in each chain. Researchers in 
[22] suggest the use of a smart contract method based on energy tokens, where the energy token 
represents a unit of power at a fixed price. This work shows that utilizing blockchain for smart 
contract allows automatic execution of energy trading contracts in a secure, decentralized 
network. Authors in [23] extend the energy token method by using a linear time-based value 
depreciation model for the energy tokens. This method stimulates energy trading by 
incentivizing the buying and selling of tokens within a time limit. An incentivizing method 
utilizing Nash bargaining theory is presented in [24]. In [25], the impact of applying load 
management on reducing the energy cost bought from a blockchain-based peer-to-peer energy 
trading market is studied. PoW is used as the blockchain consensus method in this work. 
     System security is crucial to the successful operation of interconnected energy trading 
systems, and recently proposed models have turned to blockchain technology to address these 
concerns [8, 26-30]. The work in [26] proposes a blockchain model for detecting data corruption 
produced by third party intrusions based on a collaborative intrusion detection approach. The use 
of blockchain as a means of intrusion detection removes the security risk of a central authority 
while improving the speed and accuracy of detection. A modified blockchain approach utilizing 
directed acyclic graphs is proposed in [8] to ensure the preservation of security in networked 
microgrids in order to minimize operational costs. The proposed method additionally includes a 
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data restoration technique for the event of a corruption on the blockchain due to third-party 
intrusion. A unified energy blockchain based on consortium blockchain for secure peer-to-peer 
energy trading in industrial internet of things is presented in [27]. This unified energy blockchain 
utilizes a traditional proof of work consensus method to validate blocks on the chain. To ease the 
limitation of execution time, a credit-based payment scheme is also proposed to stimulate fast 
peer-to-peer energy trading. To increase the system security and privacy, differentially private 
energy trading auction using consortium blockchain for microgrids systems is proposed in [28]. 
This model seeks to increase the security and privacy of traditional auction-based peer-to-peer 
trading by utilizing consortium blockchain technology. Researchers in [29] propose the use of 
consortium blockchain to ensure privacy protection of direct transactions between microgrids. In 
an effort to improve the efficiency of blockchain transactions, the use of practical byzantine fault 
tolerance (pBFT) is proposed as an alternative to traditional consensus methods in this work. 
Peer-to-peer energy trading based on Blockchain implementation using Hyperledger Fabric 
considering different energy transaction scenarios and crowdsources is presented in [30]. This 
work considers blockchain utilizing a modified pBFT consensus method but requires a central 
managing entity in large-scale crowdsourced implementation. 
     Based on the conducted literature review, it was found that there are three aspects that 
need further investigation: 
(i)  How the energy trading price and amount is determined for both islanded and grid-
connected microgrid networks. 
(ii)  Once a trading transaction is completed, there is a need to develop more secure energy- 
and time-efficient consensus algorithms to settle those transactions in the blockchain. 
Additionally, the existence of malicious nodes that might invalidate the voting process of 
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the consensus mechanism and manipulate the recorded data need to be considered in the 
algorithm’s development. Otherwise, the blockchain system may become insecure, 
unreliable, and inefficient. 
(iii)  In spite of the numerus advantages of using blockchain in developing a trustable trading 
environment, the concern of network privacy is still a primary concern restricting 
blockchain implementation, especially in peer-to-peer- trading mechanisms. 
1.3 Contributions 
To resolve the above challenges, the work in this thesis focuses on developing P2P 
energy trading models to facilitate transactions among microgrids in a multiagent network. Price 
negotiation mechanisms are proposed for both islanded and grid-connected microgrid networks. 
Additionally, a two-stage blockchain-based energy trading algorithm for a group of networked 
microgrids is considered to ensure the security of the energy trading mechanism. The two-stage 
algorithm develops an energy trading-based smart contract mechanism in stage one, and a 
transaction settlement method is developed in the second stage. The contribution of this work 
can be summarized as follows.  
1.  Development of a pre-conditioned smart contract-based energy trading mechanism to 
allow microgrids to establish coalitions, negotiate the electricity trading price, and the 
amount of energy to be traded. Significantly distinguished from the work in the literature, 
this method is uniquely developed in such a way that the pre-determined smart contracts 
are executed autonomously in a blindly traded energy marketplace, where peers do not 
share their data, including the energy prices during the trading process. This contributes 
to the need to develop more privacy-preserving negotiation mechanisms for peer-to-peer 
trading oriented processes. 
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2.  Distinguished from the work in the literature [16] – [26], this work proposes a new 
blockchain-based contract settlement protocol utilizing a two-phase consensus algorithm 
consisting of pBFT and a modified PoS to ensure system security, energy and time 
efficiency.  
3.  The proposed algorithm establishes a price adjustment mechanism for islanded operation 
and two distinct price adjustment mechanisms for grid-connected operation of microgrid 
networks. In contrast to the work in the literature, the cost of microgrid local resources 
(storage cost, curtailment cost, load shedding cost, and spinning reserve) are considered 
in the price adjustment process to incentivise the P2P energy trading. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is structured in five chapters. Chapter 1 provides background and motivation, 
literature review, research contributions, and a thesis outline. Chapter 2 contains an extended 
discussion of peer-to-peer energy trading applications for networked microgrids and blockchain 
technology. Chapter 3 presents the proposed energy trading model for the networked microgrid 
applications, including the development of the pricing mechanisms for islanded and grid-
connected operation and the blockchain-based settlement protocol. Chapter 4 details the 
simulation of the proposed models with an extensive presentation and analysis of the obtained 
results. Additionally, the results of the simulation are compared against existing solutions found 
in the literature. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the conclusions of the thesis work and proposes 






PEER-TO-PEER ENERGY TRADING IN DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS: AN 
OVERVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
The United States Department of Energy defines a microgrid as, “a group of 
interconnected loads and distributed energy resources within clearly defined electrical 
boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity with respect to the grid. A microgrid can 
connect and disconnect from the grid to enable it to operate in both grid-connected or island 
mode [5].” Fig. 2.1 shows a schematic diagram of the microgrid concept. From this definition we 
can identify three major distinguishing characteristics of a microgrid: (1) microgrids exist at the 
distribution level, consisting of distributed energy sources serving localized loads, (2) microgrids 
are capable of operating both with and without a connection to the power grid, and (3) 
microgrids have a layer of intelligent control, enabling the microgrid to actively manage its 
resources to operate successfully whether it is islanded or grid connected. 
  




As mentioned previously, the prevailing method of energy distribution for the last 
century has consisted of large-scale, centralized energy production facilities generating and 
transmitting power over long distances up to hundreds of miles away from the generation. To 
mitigate losses over these long distances, power is transmitted at very high voltages up to 750 
kV. Stepping up to this voltage requires large, expensive step-up transformers at the generating 
facilities, and similarly expensive step-down transformers to gradually step down from 
transmission to distribution voltage, and then finally to residential service levels. According to 
the US Energy Information Administration, the amount of power lost in transmission and voltage 
transformation is on average 5% of the total energy production [31]. Microgrids avoid the issue 
of transmission power loss altogether by relying on distributed generation technology (DG). DG 
can be defined as small energy generating resources installed at the distribution level. DG is 
already localized to the loads it serves, and therefore requires little to no power transmission to 
deliver energy to the consumer. 
An additional drawback of the current power grid system is the centralized nature of the 
power grid. Large-scale utility generation plants service thousands of individual customers 
through a small number of transmission lines, the loss of which would impact those customers. 
Conversely, the islanding capability enables microgrid to maintain the power supply during 
power grid outages, and reliably supply power to its local loads. 
The second unique characteristic of the microgrid is its ability to operate with or without 
a connection to the power grid. When the microgrid has a connection to the power grid, it is said 
to be grid-connected. This grid connection gives the microgrid the ability to exchange energy 
with the grid, either by purchasing energy from the grid in the event that the microgrid cannot 
14 
 
generate enough energy to satisfy its demand, or by selling energy to the grid in the event that 
the microgrid has generated more energy than it has demand. When the microgrid is 
disconnected from the power grid, it is said to be islanded, or operating in islanded mode. A 
microgrid operating in islanded mode does not have the capability of exchanging energy with the 
grid, and therefore must rely on its own generation to satisfy the local demand.  
Islanded operation can be either voluntary or involuntary. In the majority of voluntary 
cases, the microgrid is islanded because a connection to the grid is impractical, such as when the 
microgrid is servicing loads in a remote community [4]. Additionally, a microgrid can choose to 
enter islanded operation when the utility grid experiences disturbances. A microgrid may be 
involuntarily islanded due to a loss of the tie line between the microgrid and the power grid as a 
result of equipment failure or a severe weather event [4]. Also, a system blackout in the power 
grid could be considered an involuntary islanding. Fig. 2.1 illustrates the ability of a microgrid to 
operate in either grid connected or islanded mode. 
The third unique characteristic of the microgrid is the ability to intelligently control its 
energy resources to maximize the efficiency and increase the deployment of renewable 
distributed energy sources (RES). As mentioned previously, microgrids are equipped with an 
array of local energy sources (energy storage, dispatchable generation units, controllable loads, 
etc) which can be utilized to accommodate the variable nature of renewable generation. 
Microgrids manage its local resources in one of two primary ways: centralized control or 
distributed control. The microgrid utilizes a central controller which is tasked with scheduling 
the dispatch of the all the various energy sources and managing all the loads in the grid [32]. For 
distributed control schemes, the microgrid relies on the local control of each resource in the 
microgrid [33]. Distributed schemes are often structured as Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), where 
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each resource is equipped with a controller agent that coordinates the generation or demand of its 
resource among the other agents in the grid [34]. 
To achieve optimal management and scheduling of microgrid local resources in both 
control schemes, it is imperative of the microgrid operator to forecast the grid energy profile, 
which include demand and renewable generation forecast. In addition to its ability to forecast, 
the microgrid must also be equipped to respond to real-time forecasting errors and sudden 
contingency scenarios, such as an unscheduled islanding. Microgrid controllers must be able to 
self-stabilize through voltage and frequency control to ensure the microgrid remains operational 
[35]. 
Beyond the operational characteristics and concerns of a single microgrid, much research 
attention is being paid to the operation and interaction of groups of microgrids. Due to the 
rapidly increasing deployment of microgrids, a primary focus of microgrid research is now 
turning to the microgrid network. Networked microgrid is a large group of interconnected 
microgrids which may operate cooperatively among themselves while still remaining distinct 
from the utility grid as shown in Fig. 2.2. The ability of networked microgrids to operate 
cooperatively leads to increased energy efficiency, reduced emissions, and lower energy 
consumer costs [36]. Additionally, transitioning the utility power grid toward a system of 




Figure 2.2. Group of interconnected microgrids forming a microgrid network 
2.2. Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading Mechanism 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading represents direct energy trading between peers. For 
networked microgrids applications, energy is traded among all microgrids (peers) in the network 
to achieve a desired social welfare (e.g., reliability or economic benefits). P2P markets can also 
be defined as energy exchange platforms that create a transactive energy market for all peers to 
bid and offer for transacting energy. P2P energy trading in the microgrid network service 
towards achieving generation-demand balance while reducing the instances of load shedding and 
energy curtailment, thereby improving the energy and economic efficiency of each microgrid.  
In P2P energy trading markets, participants known as prosumers buy and sell energy 
from one another in an effort to gain economic and reliability benefits. A prosumer is an 
emerging category of energy consumer which not only consumes energy but also has the 
capacity to produce energy through installed distributed generation (most commonly renewable 
generation) as illustrated in Fig. 2.3. The primary energy source of the prosumer is therefore its 
own generation, and any energy demand above the generation capacity of the prosumer must be 
sourced from external generation, such as the power grid. Conversely, if the amount of energy 
17 
 
produced exceeds the prosumer demand, the prosumer can sell the excess energy. In this way it 
becomes easy to define a microgrid as an energy prosumer, which utilizes its own generation to 
satisfy loads, while also being able to exchange energy with external entities [37].  
 
Figure 2.3. Prosumer definition 
For reliability purposes, each prosumer aims at achieving demand-generation balance. 
However, due to fluctuations in both renewable generation and demand, achieving generation-
demand balance becomes a challenging task. Therefore, there are three distinct scenarios exist 
for the prosumer: (1) when generation-demand balance is achieved, (2) when generation is less 
than demand, and (3) when generation exceeds demand. In the first scenario, the prosumer has 
satisfied all of its loads and has no remaining energy, therefore no action is required. In the 
second scenario, the prosumer was not able to satisfy all of its loads and therefore must seek to 
purchase additional energy or be forced to shed his unsatisfied load. In the third scenario, the 
prosumer has not only satisfied all of its demand, but it also has excess energy which it may seek 
to sell at a profit, store in an energy storage system, or curtail. P2P energy trading between 
prosumers seeks to resolve the energy deficits and surpluses of scenarios (2) and (3). 
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Among the numerous P2P models developed in the literature, three primary techniques 
are employed [37]: 1) game theory, 2) auction markets, and 3) constrained optimization.  
2.2.1 Game Theory 
Game theory has been defined as the mathematical study of the interaction among 
rational decision makers. The modern development of game theory was heavily influenced by its 
use among mathematicians and economists as a tool for determining the optimal equilibrium 
among game participants [38]. In basic terms, game theory analyzes the decision-making process 
among game participants in competitive situations for which the actions of one participant both 
effect and depend on the actions of the other participants. Therefore, game theory has become a 
popular technique for developing P2P trading models where each participant is seeking to 
optimize their situation. Two general categories of games exist: cooperative games and non-
cooperative games [38]. 
In cooperative games, participants are motivated by both their self-interests and the 
interests of one, multiple, or all other participants in the game. Participants operate under 
coalition, making decisions that benefit all coalition members while fairly distributing revenue. 
Cooperative game P2P trading models involve situations where trading participants sacrifice 
their individual economic optimization to achieve an equilibrium which satisfies a larger group 
of trading participants [39]. In cooperative games, the optimal trading price is not always 
achieved. 
In non-cooperative games, all participants seek to optimize their situation based on their 
self-interests without directly communicating among other members [38]. The end goal of a non-
cooperative game is to achieve a Nash equilibrium, which is a stable state wherein no game 
participant can improve their standing by deviating from their current states. The most popular 
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non-cooperative game strategy utilized in P2P trading is the Stackelberg game. In the 
Stackelberg game, a single participant is designated as the leader and makes the first decision, 
and all other participants have the benefit of optimizing their decision based on the leader’s 
initial decision [40]. If the game is dynamic, all participants then update their decisions 
strategically to arrive at an equilibrium. In practice, this trading model would involve the leader 
offering an initial price, and all other participants providing counter-prices. After the initial set of 
prices is known, participants are able to adjust their pricing strategy to obtain the best possible 
economic outcome, i.e. selling at the highest price a buyer is willing to purchase, or purchasing 
at the lowest price a seller is willing to sell. 
2.2.2 Auction Markets 
Auction refers to the process of buying and selling a commodity by offering bids that 
establish the price at which an auction participant is willing to buy or sell the commodity being 
offered [41]. Traditionally, three types of auctions exist, depending on the number and makeup 
of the participants: forward auction, reverse auction, and double auction [42]. The most common 
type of layman’s auction is the forward auction, where a single seller is offering an item that 
receives bids from multiple potential buyers and the highest bid succeeds. The reverse auction is 
the opposite, where a single buyer accepts bids from multiple sellers where the lowest bid 
succeeds. While both the forward and reverse auction types can be used to develop P2P trading 
models, the most popular is the double auction. 
In a double auction, multiple buyers and multiple sellers participate, where buyers submit 
their bids and sellers submit their asking prices. A third-party market controller then evaluates all 
the bids and selects a price which clears the market; that is, where all sellers who asked below 
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the selected price and all buyers who bid above the selected price succeed in their sale or 
purchase [43].  
Ideally, the selected price is obtained from the intersection of the aggregated supply and 
demand curves of the available bids, known as the average mechanism [11]. However, in 
practice P2P energy trading double auctions can utilize different price determination mechanisms 
which can be designed to comply with a set of system constraints. 
2.2.3 Constrained Optimization 
Constrained optimization is the process of optimizing an objective function with respect 
to one or more variables considering limitations of those variables. For the purposes of P2P 
trading, the objective function is a cost function, which is solved to minimize the decision 
variables. Several optimization techniques have been used to develop P2P energy trading 
models, including linear programming (LP), mixed integer linear programming (MILP), and 
alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). 
In mathematics, LP is the method of achieving the optimal scenario in a model 
represented entirely by linear relationships. In other terms, LP optimizes a model defined as a 
linear equation. LP are capable of being solved very efficiently using the simplex algorithm. In 
the case of P2P energy trading, LP is utilized to determine the optimal trading decisions which 
minimize trading costs. This optimization can be done considering a single prosumer, or an 
entire P2P trading market. 
MILP is a special case of integer LP where some variables are constrained as integers 
while other variables are capable of being non-integers. Unlike LP, because of the mixture of 
integer and non-integer variables, MILP problems cannot be solved efficiently using the simplex 
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algorithm. MILP is used in much the same way as LP to develop P2P trading models, with the 
main difference being the number and mixture of decision variable types being solved. 
ADMM is a variant of the augmented Lagrangian method for solving distributed convex 
optimization problems. The ADMM works by decomposing a constrained optimization problem 
into distinct unconstrained problems which can then be solved more easily and adding a term to 
consider the error of decomposing the original problem. In the case of P2P energy trading, 
ADMM is particularly useful for dual price adjustment optimization. 
2.3 Blockchain-Based P2P Trading 
One of the fastest growing technological advances of the 21st century is the continued 
development and application of the blockchain and blockchain technology. A blockchain is a 
digital database of information containing an immutable ledger of transactions distributed in a 
decentralized network [9]. In the simplest terms, a blockchain is a growing list of records that 
cannot be changed that is shared among a group of users.  
A fairly recent concept, blockchain was first proposed in 2008 by an individual (or 
group) using the alias Satoshi Nakamoto and was originally intended as a public transaction 
ledger for the popular cryptocurrency bitcoin [44]. Since its invention, blockchain technology 
has been utilized in many applications, including cryptocurrency, banking, supply chain 
logistics, smart contracts, and energy trading.  
Blockchain takes its name from the structure of its data as a chain of discrete information 
blocks which form a digital ledger. Each block in the chain contains the informational details of 
a discrete transaction record, with each transaction being recorded on a new block in a time-
linear manner [9]. The information contained in each block includes the identification of the 
parties participating in the transaction, the amount of the commodity being transacted, the price 
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of that transaction (if applicable), the precise time of the transaction, and often a nonce, which is 
a random string of numbers. Additional information can be included to suit the particular 
application. Fig. 2.4 illustrates a simple schematic diagram of the blockchain structure. 
 
Figure 2.4. General blockchain structure  
In addition to the transactional information and the nonce, each block contains an alpha-
numeric string known as a hash, which is obtained by inputting the information from the block 
into a hash function (a special mathematical function) which generates a fixed-length hash that is 
deterministic with regard to the input [46]. The hash of the block is then published at the end of 
the block. Furthermore, the next block in the chain will add the previous hash to its block data 
before hashing, which will contribute to the input of the hash function to generate the hash that 
will be published to the end of the second block. The third block will adopt the hash of the 
second, and so on. This process of relating each block by their hashes is where the chain concept 
originates [9].  
When a block is added to the blockchain, all information is then updated synchronously 
to the entire network that shares the blockchain. This ensures that all participants have the same 
blockchain record. If any of the data in a chained block is modified, even by a single character, 
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the hash generated with that block will change. Since the tampered block’s hash has changed, it 
no longer matches the hash found in the data of next block and indicates the tampering of the 
block. In this way, a malicious actor that wishes to tamper with a block would also have to 
update the information in the next block (and also the previous block). However, altering the 
information in the second block will cause hash mismatch between the second and third blocks, 
and so the information of the third block must also be updated. Therefore, altering the 
information of just one block causes an increasing ripple effect. Additionally, since the 
blockchain is distributed among all network participants, the malicious actor would have to alter 
all copies of the blockchain simultaneously. This would require individual access to all 
decentralized machines with a copy of the blockchain, which is also practically infeasible. 
The immutability of blocks, coupled with the decentralized distribution of the blockchain 
record, make blockchain an attractive solution to cybersecurity concerns for financial 
transactions in energy trading [9]. Additionally, blockchains employ a consensus method as a 
requirement for adding blocks to the blockchain, which protects the blockchain from malicious 
actors that would seek to record false information on the blockchain. These consensus methods 
require that a form of proof be provided that the block being added to the blockchain is valid. 
Various consensus methods have been developed, including PoW, PoS, Proof of Authority 
(PoA), and pBFT [16]. 
PoW is the original and most widely used algorithm for determining blockchain 
consensus. By definition, PoW describes a system that requires a not-insignificant amount of 
computational effort to complete a task, which acts as a deterrent to malicious abuse. For 
blockchain applications, PoW relies on the addition of the previously mentioned nonce, where 
blockchain participants called miners guess the nonce value that will produce a hash for the 
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block below a certain target hash value. Determining a nonce value which will satisfy the given 
condition is non-trivial, and the target hash is most often selected such that it requires 
approximately 10 minutes to solve for the nonce. Once the nonce has been solved for, the valid 
hash is broadcast to the network and the validated block is added to the chain. 
PoS was proposed as an alternative to the PoW algorithm, which is both energy and time 
inefficient due to the high computational requirements. PoS works on the basis of “stake”, 
wherein a validator for a proposed block is chosen randomly from a group of validators that have 
a certain level of stake in the blockchain. Individuals who participate in the blockchain and 
validate blocks more often accrue more stake, which in turn gives them a higher chance of being 
selected to validate new blocks.  
Conceptually, tying the validation of new blocks to stake deters malicious actors from 
attempting to accrue high levels of stake in order to manipulate the blockchain, since accruing 
stake also means the individual is increasingly reliant on the accuracy of the chain, therefore 
making it self-detrimental to manipulate the chain. The concept of stake was originally 
established based on cryptocurrency but can also be defined according to the specific blockchain 
application. For instance, when PoS is used for energy trading, stake can be defined as the 
number of blocks the individual has previously participated in. 
PoA is a consensus method typically reserved for permissioned blockchain. In contrast to 
traditional blockchains which are publicly distributed, permissioned blockchains are only 
distributed among a group of trusted peers [46]. Among the group of blockchain participants, 
PoA requires a subset of accounts which have the authority to validate blocks for the blockchain. 
In this way, PoA is a more centralized consensus method since is relies on a controlled group of 
privileged blocks. While this method provides a much faster and more automatic method of 
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validation, it also requires that authorized participants be highly trusted and have very strong 
individual security, since a malicious actor can target these authorized participants in order to 
gain validation privileges. 
Unlike the other consensus methods, pBFT is not a direct proof method. Instead, pBFT 
relies on applying the concept of BFT for the purposes of block validation. BFT refers to the 
ability for a distributed network to reach an assured consensus despite the presence of faulty or 
malicious nodes that propagate false data. The distinguishing feature of pBFT is the use of two 
voting rounds to reach consensus. When a block requires validated, the block is compiled by the 
transacting parties and sent to a participant known as the primary. The primary then broadcasts 
the block proposal to the network. This commences the first voting round, wherein each 
participant broadcasts an acknowledge message to the network that it has obtained the block to 
be validated. This is the first vote, and each network participant is then waiting to receive votes 
from a pre-determined threshold (usually 2/3) of the network [47]. When a participant receives 
the requisite number of votes, it sends a second vote which acknowledges whether it approves 
the block being validated. Once the second vote has been broadcast for more than 2/3 of the 
network the block is validated and the primary appends the block to the chain [47]. In this way, 
the network is capable of tolerating up to 1/3 of network not participating or behaving contrary to 
the other network members. Malicious actors would need to gain control over more than 1/3 of 
all network participants to manipulate the blockchain [47]. 
The blockchain is becoming a popular choice for secure P2P energy trading in 
decentralized networks due to the immutability of the blockchain record and the consensus 
methods used to validate energy transactions appended to the chain [9]. For instance, smart 
contract architectures for decentralized P2P energy trading based on Blockchain is a commonly 
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used method. The smart contract is defined as a computerized transaction protocol that executes 
the terms of a contract [37]. By converting contractual conditions into code and embedding them 
into property that enables self-executing of trusted transactions and agreements between 
different, anonymous nodes without the need for a central authority. For blockchain applications, 
smart contracts are scripts stored on the blockchain with a unique hash [37]. A smart contract is 
triggered by addressing a transaction to it. It then executes independently and automatically in a 










THE PROPOSED P2P ENERGY TRADING MODELS 
 
3.1 Islanded Operation Mode – Multiagent Model 
The entire interconnected islanded microgrid system is modeled as a distributed multi-
agent network, where each agent (microgrid) is a node of the network. Multi-agent coalition 
refers to a way to cooperate agents to complete a task, where none of them can complete it 
independently [21]. Based on this definition, it was assumed that each microgrid (agent) consists 
of only renewable distributed generation and power demand. Since all microgrids are connected 
to each other and disconnected from the power grid, thus, the grid back up is unavailable. 
Therefore, the task of all microgrid operators in the islanded system is to balance local renewable 
generation and demand. Hence, achieving zero net load is used to measure the level of 
satisfaction of all participants in the P2P trading. It should be noted that the net load is defined as 
demand minus renewable generation. All microgrids in the islanded system share a common 
interest which is satisfying their net load; hence, they agree to work in a collaborative manner to 
satisfy their net load. It is also assumed that each microgrid does not have sufficient non-
renewable local resources (e.g, dispatchable units, storage, controllable loads). Therefore, each 
microgrid is extensively incentivized to participate in the P2P trading to balance their net load. 
This incentive mechanism can be justified based on the fact that reliability benefits are main 
drivers of microgrids operation in islanded mode [48]. Limited capacity of local resources can be 
used only as a back-up if the power exchanged in the P2P trading is insufficient to balance their 
net load. Therefore, it is not required to formulate a scheduling optimization problem since 
dispatchable units, storage and controllable loads are not primarily used to balance the net load.  
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In terms of the model architecture, each node represents a microgrid consisting of 
renewable generators, and power demand, local controller, and trade controller in a layered 
architecture. The renewable distributed generation and power demand are located in the physical 
resource layer. On top of that there is the local controller agent (LCA), which is mandated to 
manage the load and renewable generation data (forecasting hourly net load). In the event of 
energy deficit or surplus, the local controller forwards the information to the trade agent (TA) 
which is tasked with buying or selling energy to satisfy the microgrid hourly net load for the day 
ahead 24-hour time horizon. A graphical illustration of the system model is given in Fig. 3.1. The 
overall trading model is described in detail in the following sections. 
  
Figure 3.1. System Model (islanded operation) 
 
3.1.1 Seller and Buyer Identification  
It is assumed that all microgrids have the capability to forecast their power demand and 
generation for a particular time slot 𝑡𝑡, and is beyond the scope of this work. Hence, the energy 
production and consumption for each time interval 𝑡𝑡 in the time horizon 𝑇𝑇 is generated randomly 
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by utilizing the Mersenne Twister pseudo-random number generator [49], The Mersenne Twister 
outputs a statistically uniform distribution between the upper and lower bounds detailed in 
equations (1), and (2) obtained from [50] with a slight modification. Utilizing the Mersenne 
Twister pseudo-random number generator was based on the fact that for each time horizon 𝑇𝑇, 
there is a maximum value for the renewable generation and electric load, below which the sub-
horizon values are permitted to vary in a quasi-random fashion dictated by a Mersenne Twister 
pseudo-random number generator [51]. 
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The local controller determines the renewable generation-based net load of each 
microgrid by: 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃;(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔(𝑡𝑡)                                 (3) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) < 0 denotes an energy surplus while 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 (𝑡𝑡) > 0 indicates an energy deficit. If 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 = 0 the microgrid has reached generation-demand balance. For all time intervals where 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 ≠ 0, the local controller notifies the trade controller of the need to buy or sell energy. A 
microgrid with a negative net load is identified as a seller, whereas a microgrid with a positive 
net load is identified as a buyer as shown in equations (4) and (5). 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) < 0 ⇒   𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢                              (4) 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡) > 0 ⇒   𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 = 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢                               (5) 
3.1.2 Price Adjustment and Contract Matching Mechanism 
After determining the remaining net load, the local controller forwards the hourly energy 
deficit or surplus information to the trade controller to interface with the other microgrids 
participating in the local energy trading marketplace. For each round 𝑟𝑟 in the time interval 𝑡𝑡 
30 
 
(hourly time interval) in 24-hour day ahead scenario, formulated energy selling contracts are 
offered at fixed prices by microgrids with surplus power, and energy buyers bid for these 
contracts with prices offered by microgrids with power deficit. Both sellers and buyers aim to get 
their contracts matched and executed to satisfy their net load since grid backup is absent. The 
contract matching process is developed as follows: 
 1) Sellers start with high fixed energy prices and make progressively lower offers in an effort 
to match the price of potential buyers after each unsuccessful offering round. Conversely, buyers 
start with low fixed prices and making progressively higher offers in an effort to match the prices 
offered in seller contracts.  
 2) For each round 𝑟𝑟 in the time interval 𝑡𝑡, an autonomous contract matching round is done in 
the marketplace considering the following possible scenarios:  
(i) If 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 the contract is automatically executed.  
(ii) If 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 > 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢, the buyer moves on to the next available contract.  
(iii) If after the first trading round the offered contract did not receive a match from a 
potential buyer, the seller must lower its contract selling price using (6) and the 
buyer must increase the desired purchase price using (7). The contract will 
automatically execute when the buyer and seller prices converge in a future round. 
The contract price adjustment mechanism is developed as follows:  
 1) For time intervals when 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 < 0, the microgrid is designated as a seller (𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 is identified 
as 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢) and the trade controller authors an energy contract containing the amount of surplus 
power for sale and the price per kW of the power being sold. The seller calculates the desired 
selling price for each contract offering round as shown in (6). 
𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 − 1) − 𝜏𝜏�𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)� + 𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢      (6) 
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It should be noted that 𝑡𝑡 indicates the hourly time interval of the considered 24-hour time 
horizon, and 𝑟𝑟 represents the trading round in hour 𝑡𝑡. Since grid tie is unavailable for the 
islanded microgrid network, the seller initially attempts to sell with a price higher than the utility 
price in the first round (𝑟𝑟 = 1), denoted as 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓, where 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 is designed such that 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 >
𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 (the seller intends to sell at higher than the utility price). Therefore, when 𝑟𝑟 = 1, 
𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 − 1) is equal to the initial price 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓. To ensure price fairness and avoid price 
adjustment manipulation by the seller, a maximum threshold for 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 is specified by the 
marketplace and agreed on by all microgrid operators.  
If the offered contract did not receive a match in the first round, the seller must lower its 
selling price according to (6). The price is reduced considering the operation cost of battery 
storage, curtailment cost, and transmission cost, where the second term in (6) represents the 
battery operation cost for each charging cycle, and the third term represents the energy 
curtailment cost. The cost of curtailment is modeled as a loss of revenue where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 in 
the first round and 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1) for all sequential rounds. It should be noted that curtailment is 
applied only when the surplus power (𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢) is higher than the battery charging limit for each 
round (|𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢| > 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥). Hence, the curtailed amount of power for each round is a 
percentage of the difference between the surplus power and the power charged in the battery 
(𝛼𝛼|𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢| − 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟). It should be noted that 𝜏𝜏 is a binary variable with a value of 0 in the first round 
and 1 in all subsequent rounds for each hour. The fourth term indicates the transmission cost, 
where 𝐴𝐴 is the distance matrix that represents the distance between any two microgrids in the 
network, 𝑖𝑖 is the buyer microgrid index and 𝑗𝑗 is the seller microgrid index; hence 𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗 is the 
distance between microgrid 𝑖𝑖, and microgrid 𝑗𝑗. The price adjustment process in (6) is developed 
based on the fact that sellers would tend to charge and curtail surplus power to satisfy its net load 
32 
 
if they did not sell their excess power. Microgrids are motivated to utilize energy trading to avoid 
these high costs, therefore the seller will go back and adjust its selling price after each round 
until it gets its contract matched and executed.  
 2) For time intervals where 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 > 0, the microgrid is designated as a buyer (𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 is identified 
as 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢) and the trade controller enters the marketplace to evaluate potential contract purchases. 
The buyer enters the marketplace with a desired purchase price calculated using (7). 
𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 − 1) + 𝜏𝜏 �𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟ℎ�𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔��               (7) 
Since grid tie is unavailable for the islanded microgrid network, the buyer initially 
attempts to purchase power with a price lower than the utility price in the first round (𝑟𝑟 = 1), 
denoted as 𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓, where 𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 is designed such that 𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 < 𝜆𝜆𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 (the buyer intends to pay 
less than the utility price). ). Therefore, when 𝑟𝑟 = 1, 𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 − 1) is equal to the initial price 
𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓. To avoid manipulation of the price adjustment by the buyer, a minimum threshold for 
𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 is specified by the marketplace and agreed upon by all microgrid operators. In addition, 
all cost parameters (e.g, 𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔,𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟ℎ ,𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 ,𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐) used in price adjustment equations are constant and 
determined by the local marketplace in which all peers are trading.  
If the offered buying contract did not receive a match, the buyer will increase its offered 
buying price. The price is increased considering the operation cost of dispatchable units and load 
shedding cost, where the second term in (7) denotes the dispatchable unit operation cost for a 
committed cycle, and the third term indicates the load shedding cost. It should be noted that load 
shedding is applied only when the deficit power (𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢) is larger than the backup dispatchable 
unit output power limit for each round (�𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 � > 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥). Hence, the amount of deficit power to 
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be shed is a percentage of the difference between the deficit power and the power supplied by the 
dispatchable unit (𝛽𝛽(|𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢| − 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)).  
The price adjustment process in (7) is designed based on the fact that buyers would have 
to get power from back up dispatchable units, as well as applying load shedding to balance its 
deficit net load if they did not buy power. Microgrids with energy deficits are motivated to avoid 
these high costs, and therefore the buyer will go back and adjust (increase) its buying price after 
each round until it gets its contract matched and executed. The complete contract price 
adjustment and execution algorithm is shown in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1. Price adjustment and contract execution algorithm – islanded operation 
Algorithm 1. Islanded Operation 
1: when 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 < 0 ⇒ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 
2: when 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 > 0 ⇒ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 = 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢  
3: 𝑟𝑟 = 1 
4: while contract = FALSE 
5:   if 𝑟𝑟 = 1 
6:    𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 − 𝜏𝜏�𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)� + 𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 
7:    𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢
𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓 + 𝜏𝜏 �𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟ℎ�𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔�� 
8: else 
9:  𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 − 1) − 𝜏𝜏�𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)� + 𝐴𝐴𝑢𝑢,𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 
10:   𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟 − 1) + 𝜏𝜏 �𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟ℎ�𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔�� 
11:  if 𝜆𝜆𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 ≥ 𝜆𝜆𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 
12:  contract = TRUE 
13:  else 




The blockchain in this work is used only as a secure settlement protocol after the contract 
execution. Even though the autonomous contract execution using blockchain is beyond the scope 
of this work, it can be done as follows:  
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Sellers and buyers prepare their contract condition off-chain, and then they compile and 
deploy their smart contract for possible execution to the local marketplace using an appropriate 
blockchain architecture that supports smart contract and deterministic consensus protocols. 
Hyperledger is a private blockchain software [52] that provides a modular architecture that 
makes it simple to implement smart contracts and deterministic pBFT-bases distributed 
consensus [53]. For instance, the energy trading model proposed in [54] adopted Hyperledger 
platform for implementing the proposed model. Furthermore, to avoid trade manipulation, 
prospective energy buyers do not share their desired purchase prices with energy sellers. Sellers 
that are aware of desired buying prices can manipulate trade by i) overvaluing their contracts by 
holding to a higher price knowing that prospective buyers will raise the desired buying price to 
meet energy demands or ii) under-valuing their contracts in order to undercut competition and 
execute more contracts. The converse is true for buyers manipulating buying prices. Therefore, 
prices should not be shared between buyers and sellers during contract's matching process. This 
can be done by encrypting the data included in the contract before it is broadcast in the 
marketplace. For instance, the confidential transactions technique discussed in [55] can be 
adopted where the buyer and seller have contract s that contain price and other confidential 
information. The technique of confidential transactions is to keep the price amount secret and to 
grant verifiers the ability to check the validity of amounts [56]. In this case, buyer and seller 
perform a two-stage encryption process. At first, buyer and seller perform cryptographic hash 
operation on their contracts to preserve the confidentiality and authenticity of data to each other. 
Then, the buyer adds a public-key or asymmetric cryptography to further protect data from 3rd 
party (intruder) intervention/malicious party. In particular, each of the buyers and sellers 
generate a public-key and a private-key. The buyer then encrypts its (cryptographic hashed) 
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contracts with the public key of the seller. The seller then decrypts data using its own private 
key. Once the seller decrypts the other party's data, its smart contract system performs price-
matching. Note that this price-matching operation contains a smart algorithm that can work on 
the cryptographic-hash (price) amounts from buyer and seller and make a decision [55]. Once 
this contract matching operation is done, it informs the buyers and the sellers about its decision. 
In this way, buyer and seller are not exposed to the price of each other and hence the overall 
confidentiality is preserved. 
3.2 Grid Connected Operation Mode – Multiagent Model 
3.2.1 Formulation of The Optimization Scheduling Problem 
In the first stage of the energy trading model for grid-connected operation, each 
microgrid solves a local energy resource scheduling problem. Since all microgrids in the network 
are independent entities with unique self-interests, each microgrid solves its own local optimal 
scheduling problem with an objective to minimize its operation cost. The scheduling problem is 
modeled as Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) problem. It was assumed that all 
microgrid are connected to each other and connected to the main utility grid. 
min∑ �𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢
𝑔𝑔𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 + 𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑢𝑢𝑦𝑦𝑢𝑢 + 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝑧𝑧𝑢𝑢 + 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢
𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢
𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓 + 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐|𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢|�24𝑢𝑢=1          (8) 
The first term of the objective function shown in (8) includes the cost of a dispatchable 
generation unit, followed by the startup and shutdown costs associated with the dispatchable 
generation unit. The fourth term is the operational cost of the Battery Storage System (BSS). The 
fifth term is the cost of energy exchanged with the grid (either purchased or sold), and the sixth 
term is cost the curtailed power (curtailed excess generation or curtailed excess load), where  
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 is the hourly curtailed net load. It should be noted that 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 is negative for excess 
generation (curtailed power), and positive for deficit power (curtailed load). The net load is 
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defined as the hourly demand minus hourly renewable generation. Each microgrid will trade its 
excess net load 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 with other microgrids to avoid generation and load curtailment cost, hence; 
minimize its operation cost. The objective function is subject to the following constraints: 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢
𝑔𝑔 + 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 + 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢




𝑔𝑔,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥                                (10) 
𝑦𝑦𝑢𝑢 − 𝑧𝑧𝑢𝑢 = 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 − 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢−1                                   (11) 
𝑦𝑦𝑢𝑢 + 𝑧𝑧𝑢𝑢 ≤ 1                                       (12) 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢                          (13) 
𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ≥ 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢                          (14) 
𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 + 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 ≤ 1                                       (15) 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟                                  (16) 
𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑢𝑢 ≤ 𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥                                  (17) 
�𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢
𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓� ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥                                   (18) 
The power balance equation (9) represents the power balance equation of each microgrid. 
Equation (10) ensures that the dispatchable generator operates within its operational limits. The 
constraint (11) ensures that a startup or shutdown only occurs when there is a change in the 
operating state of the generator from ON to OFF and vice versa. Equation (12) ensures that the 
generation unit cannot start-up and shutdown in the same hourly time interval. Equations (13) 
and (14) show the charge and discharge constraints of the BSS, while equation (15) ensures the 
BSS is not simultaneously charging and discharging in the same hourly time interval. Equation 
(16) shows that the SOC of the BSS is affected by the amount of energy charged or discharged 
from the BSS at hour 𝑡𝑡. The SOC of the battery storage system is limited by (17). The constraint 
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in (18) ensures that the power exchanged with the utility grid is limited by the maximum 
capacity of the tie line. 
3.2.2 Energy Trading and Price Adjustment Model – Model I 
After the scheduling problem has been solved, each microgrid has determined its 
remaining net load, modeled as 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢, which represents the surplus or deficit power for each 
hourly time interval t. Each microgrid intends to satisfy 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 by trading in the marketplace to 
avoid generation curtailment cost.  If 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 < 0 (surplus power), the microgrid will sell the 
surplus power. Whereas, if 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 > 0 (deficit power), the microgrid will purchase power from the 
market to satisfy its deficit load and avoid the high cost of load curtailment. Hence, for each 
hourly time interval, microgrids with excess power will be identified as sellers, and microgrids 
with deficit power will be identified as buyers. Fig. 3.2 shows a flowchart of the overall trading 
model. 
It is worth noting that the deficit and excess power cannot be traded with the utility grid 
because the maximum power that can be traded with the utility grid is limited by the tie line 




Figure 3.2. Flowchart of the proposed trading model (grid connected operation) 
Similar to the system described for islanded operation, the microgrid network is modelled 
as a multi-agent system, where each microgrid in the network represents an agent. Each agent 
(microgrid) includes one local coordination agent (LCA), and one trading agent (TA). The LCA 
performs autonomous energy management by solving a local scheduling problem to determine 
optimal control actions of the local energy resources and the net load to be traded. The LCA 
forwards the net load information to the TA, which is tasked with resolving each microgrid net 
load by facilitating energy trading among marketplace participants. In contrast to the system 
model for islanded operation, in grid-connected operation the trading agent is also capable of 







Figure 3.3. System model (grid-connected operation) 
Before offering their energy contracts in the marketplace, microgrids which will be 
selling energy calculate their initial offering price as a function of their excess power according 
to the developed formula shown in (19). Similarly, buyers calculate their initial offered price as a 
function of their deficit power demands according to equation (20). 





𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓                             (19) 
𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢





𝑔𝑔𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓                            (20) 
Equations (19) and (20) are designed in such a way that microgrids with a lower 
magnitude of 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢are more willing to exchange energy at a price closer to the utility prices, 
while microgrids with higher magnitudes of 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢are more motivated to maximize their economic 
benefits (sellers maximizing profits, and buyers minimizing energy purchase cost).  
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Sellers will then publish their initial contracts to the marketplace detailing their power 
available for purchase and the offered price per unit of power. Seller contracts on the 
marketplace are sorted, with the lowest contract price considered first, followed by the second 
lowest contract price, and continuing in that fashion. Trading rounds for hour 𝑡𝑡 begin with buyers 
attempting to purchase power by matching their prices to the initial offering prices of the 
available contracts starting at seller index 𝑚𝑚 = 0. The contract matching process can be 
summarized as follows: 
1) If 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 ≥ 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 the contract is a match for the buyer-seller pair (𝑛𝑛,𝑚𝑚) and the transaction will 
be executed at the price 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢.  If 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 > 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 then the amount of exchanged power will 
equal 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢, resulting in buyer 𝑛𝑛 fully satisfying its load and dropping from the market for 
hour 𝑡𝑡, while the remaining balance of 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 will remain available for purchase in the 
marketplace. Whereas, If 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 < 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 then the amount of exchanged power will equal 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢, 
resulting in seller 𝑚𝑚 fully depleting its excess power and dropping from the market for hour 
𝑡𝑡, while the buyer 𝑛𝑛 with remaining demand equal to 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 will continue to purchase 
available power in the marketplace to satisfy its load. 
2) If 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 < 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢, the contract is not a match, and buyer 𝑛𝑛 moves to the next available contract. 
If after all matching contracts are executed in round 𝑟𝑟 there still exists sellers with surplus 
power and buyers with deficit power, then the remaining sellers and buyers will update their 
prices according to equations (21) and (22), respectively, and begin the next trading round. 
Equations (21) and (22) are designed to motivate market participants to trade by incrementally 
reducing the price of sellers and increasing the price of buyers after each trading round until their 
prices converge. The rationale behind (21) and (22) is that the seller price decreases with the 
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increase in the number of matching rounds, while the buyer price increases with the increase of 
the number of matching rounds.  
𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1) −
𝑐𝑐−1
𝑐𝑐+𝑐𝑐!
𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1)                           (21) 
𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1) + 𝑐𝑐−1
𝑐𝑐+𝑐𝑐!
𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1)                            (22) 
The remaining seller contracts are resorted by price low to high, and the buyers then 
attempt to match their prices with available contracts in the same manner for subsequent rounds 
until either ∑𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 = 0 or ∑𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 = 0. If there is no available energy left in the marketplace, the 
remaining microgrids with energy deficits will curtail their remaining loads. Similarly, if there 
are no willing buyers left in the marketplace, the remaining microgrids with surplus power will 
curtail their excess generation. Table 3.2 depicts the contract offering and matching algorithm. 
Table 3.2. Price adjustment and contract execution algorithm – grid-connected operation model I 
Algorithm 2. Grid-connected operation – model I 
1: when 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 < 0 ⇒ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 = 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 
2: when 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 > 0 ⇒ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 = 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 
3: 𝑟𝑟 = 1 
4: while contract = FALSE 
5:   if 𝑟𝑟 = 1 






7:    𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢







9:  𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1) −
𝑐𝑐−1
𝑐𝑐+𝑐𝑐!
𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1) 
10:   𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1) + 𝑐𝑐−1
𝑐𝑐+𝑐𝑐!
𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1) 
11:  if 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 ≥ 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 
12:  contract = TRUE 
13:  else 




3.2.3 Energy Trading and Price Adjustment Model – Model II 
The calculation of initial offering prices for buyers and sellers is conducted in the same 
manner as above with equations (19) and (20). Similarly, the contract matching process proceeds 
as described above, with one of two possible outcomes: 
1) If 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 ≥ 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 the contract is a match for the buyer-seller pair (𝑛𝑛,𝑚𝑚) and the transaction will 
be executed at the price 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢. 
2) If 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 < 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢, the contract is not a match, and buyer 𝑛𝑛 moves to the next available contract. 
Diverging from the previous model: if after all matching contracts are executed for round 
𝑟𝑟 = 1 there still exist sellers with surplus power and buyers with deficit power, then all 
microgrids still participating will update their prices according to equation (23) for buyers and 
equation (24) for sellers. 
𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1) �1 + 𝛼𝛼�𝑘𝑘 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢��  + 𝜏𝜏�(𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) + (𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟ℎ(𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝))�     (23) 
 
𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1) − 𝜏𝜏(𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)                    (24) 
 
Buyers calculate their price adjustment considering transmission losses in the second 
term of (23), where the transmission cost is calculated as a fixed percentage of the traded energy. 
The third term in (23) considers the cost of peak plant generation and load shedding, while the 
fourth term includes the cost of load shedding. The binary variable 𝜏𝜏 has a value of 0 when 𝑟𝑟 = 1 
and a value of 1 otherwise. Likewise, the binary variable 𝛼𝛼 has the opposite conditions, having a 
value of 1 when 𝑟𝑟 = 1 and 0 otherwise. The constant 𝛽𝛽 limits the amount of load shedding to 1 
percent of the remaining load. Sellers calculate their price adjustment considering energy 
curtailment in the second term and battery storage costs in the third term. The maximum energy 
available from peak generation is defined as (25), while the amount of energy curtailed is defined 
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in (26), and the amount of energy charged to the battery is limited by (27). Table 3.3 depicts the 
contract offering and matching algorithm for grid-connected operation model II. 
𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 0.1 × 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢                                    (25) 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = 0.05 × 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢                                   (26) 
𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑐𝑐ℎ,𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥                                   (27) 
Table 3.3. Price adjustment and contract execution algorithm – grid-connected operation model II 
Algorithm 3. Grid-connected operation – model II 
1: when 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 < 0 ⇒ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 = 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 
2: when 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 > 0 ⇒ 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 = 𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢  
3: 𝑟𝑟 = 1 
4: while contract = FALSE 
5:   if 𝑟𝑟 = 1 
6:  𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢,𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 − 𝜏𝜏(𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)  
7:  𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢,𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑥𝑥𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 �1 + 𝛼𝛼�𝑘𝑘 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢��  + 𝜏𝜏�(𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) + (𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟ℎ(𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝))� 
8: else 
9:  𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1) − 𝜏𝜏(𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)  
10:  𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟) = 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢(𝑟𝑟 − 1) �1 + 𝛼𝛼�𝑘𝑘 𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢��  + 𝜏𝜏�(𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) + (𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟ℎ(𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢 − 𝑃𝑃𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝))� 
11:  if 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢
𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 ≥ 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 
12:  contract = TRUE 
13:  else 
14:  𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟 + 1 
15: end 
 
After adjusting prices, buyers and sellers again attempt to match prices to execute 
contracts. This process continues until there is no more surplus or deficit energy available in the 
marketplace. If after all buyer and seller contract matches there still exists an energy deficit for 
the final buyer, the final seller will offer an additional amount of energy above the initial contract 
offer by utilizing a spinning reserve. Spinning reserve is the extra generating capacity available 
in a dispatched generator which can be utilized to compensate for power shortages. It is assumed 
that the seller is equipped with a spinning reserve margin from dispatchable generation which 
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can supply up to an additional 20% of the available energy. This additional energy is offered at a 
higher price according to the cost of reserve energy (𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟). If the second selling price is less than 
the penalty cost of load shedding for the buyer and the buyer still needs to purchase energy to 
satisfy its deficit, then a subsequent contract will be executed which transfers to the buyer an 
amount of reserve generation up to 20% of the final seller’s original excess power balance. The 
contract will be executed with an agreed upon price for the cost of the reserve energy. The total 
cost of the reserve contract is defined by (28). The amount of reserve energy exchanged in the 
contract is defined by (29) where 𝑧𝑧 is defined by (30) as a percentage of the seller energy and 
limited to be less than 0.2. 
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑢 = 𝑧𝑧𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟                                 (28) 




                                      (30) 
3.3 Two-Phase Blockchain Consensus Protocol 
To enable a trusted settlement of electricity trading transactions, a smart blockchain-
based contracts protocol for transaction settlement is developed. The proposed blockchain 
method uses a traditional distributed ledger consisting of blocks of data that are connected in a 
single chain. These blocks of data contain the details of the finalized contract from the trading 
marketplace, including the network address of the buyer and seller, the amount of energy being 
trading, the price per kilowatt of the contract, the timestamp when the contract was executed, the 
hash from the previous block, and a new hash generated using the SHA-256 hashing algorithm. 
Because this ledger chain is a distributed ledger, each node of the network maintains a copy of 
the ledger.  
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Before a block is appended to the ledger chain, it must be validated using a consensus 
method. A two-phase consensus process method is proposed. In the first phase, a pBFT is 
adopted. pBFT has been proposed in recent years as a viable alternative to popular consensus 
methods such as PoW and PoS. Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) refers to the ability for a 
distributed network to reach an assured consensus despite the presence of faulty or malicious 
nodes that propagate false data. The consensus process developed in this work is shown in Fig. 
3.4.  
 
Figure 3.4. pBFT two round voting process with faulty node tolerance 
The pBFT is an optimized application of traditional BFT method, which ensures 
consensus for any network of size 3f + 1 when there exists 2f + 1 validating responses (where f 
denotes the maximum number of faulty nodes). 
The pBFT works by a voting consensus where each node has an equally weighted vote 
value. For each block validation process the following steps are implemented:  
1) Initiate: a random node (microgrid) is selected to be the primary node. The primary node 
broadcasts the proposed block including the contract data to each of the secondary nodes 
in the network.  
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2) Acknowledge: Each of the secondary nodes broadcasts a vote to acknowledge their receipt 
of the proposed block to each node.  
3) Validate: After receiving 2𝑓𝑓 +  1 approval messages, a node will broadcast a validation 
message if the data in the proposed block is valid.  
4) Finalize: When 2𝑓𝑓 +  1 validation messages are received, the block has been validated 
and is moved to the second phase of the consensus process.  
It should be noted that according to traditional pBFT implementation, the network is 
secure for any network of size 3𝑓𝑓 +  1 where f is the maximum number of faulty nodes. 
Therefore, in a system where greater than 1/3 of nodes are faulty (corrupted or non-functioning), 
the pBFT no longer ensures a secure consensus. In the proposed model, the voting criteria is 
modified from the traditional 1/3 fault protection to be 2𝑓𝑓 +  1, because this criteria is greater 
than 2/3 of the network size. While a 2/3 criteria is sufficiently safe, the margin of error is a 
motivating factor for introducing the modified PoS as a second phase of consensus.  
To ensure a high level of security, a simultaneous second phase of consensus is 
conducted using a modified version of PoS consensus. For this consensus method, each 
microgrid is assigned a semi-random value generated using a weighting factor. This weighting 
factor corresponds to the recent history of participation in the energy trading marketplace, where 
microgrids with higher levels of participation are assigned higher weighting factors. After stakes 
values have been generated, the microgrid with the highest stake value during each consensus 
round is chosen as a special independent validator node. This validator node constructs a block 
using the same contract data as was broadcast in the pBFT consensus round and compares its 
block to the one validated using the pBFT consensus. If these two blocks match, the validator 
broadcasts a final confirmation that the block is valid, and it is appended to the public chain. If 
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the two blocks do not match, it indicates a fault that has manipulated the formed block, and an 
notification will be propagated to report a data manipulation incident. The overall two-phase 
consensus algorithm is illustrated in Table 3.3, where each microgrid is described as a prosumer.  
 
Table 3.4. Two-phase blockchain consensus protocol 
In comparison with other common blockchain consensus methods, pBFT shows several 
advantages. Firstly, pBFT has no fixed time requirements before consensus can be reached. PoW 
and the traditional PoS both have fixed time interval requirements before a proposed block can 
be validated. Additionally, pBFT does not require additional resources specific to the blockchain 
creation, instead utilizing existing network technology and processing capabilities to perform the 
block validation function. PoW requires expensive, special purpose computing hardware to 
perform block validation tasks which consume a significant amount of energy and financial 
resources. Furthermore, traditional PoS requires participants to be willing to use expendable 
financial resources in order to wager for validation rights. 
It is important to mention, however, that pBFT-based consensus methods have scalability 
issues regarding its use for a massive number of nodes. However, methods including partitioning 
48 
 
the network into smaller groups called federates have been shown to result in improved scaling 
up to 1000 nodes [4].  
The complete two-stage energy trading model which summarizes the trading process for 
all proposed models, including price negotiation mechanism and blockchain-based contract 
settlement, is detailed in the flowchart shown in Fig. 3.5. 
 
 














Sellers offer contract at desired selling 
prices. Buyers evaluate contracts 





4.1 Islanded Operation Mode – Multiagent Model 
The proposed model was simulated using Python 3.6 in Microsoft Visual Studio 
Professional 2017 on a quad-core 2 GHz CPU equipped with 16 GB RAM. For adjusting the 
contract price, the charge cost of the battery storage is considered to be $0.03/kW [57] with a 
charging limit per round of 2 kW. The adopted $0.25/kWh operation cost of dispatchable unit is 
obtained from [58] with a slight modification, considering a ramp rate of 5 kW per round. The 
load shedding cost adopted in in this study is $1.0/kW [59]. The maximum curtailment ratio for 
each round is taken as 1% of the hourly surplus net load value. The load shedding ratio for each 
round is taken as 4% of the deficit hourly net load value. Transmission cost is considered to be 
2.8 × 10−6 $/(kWh. km) [60]. The simulation is carried out with 𝑇𝑇 = 24 hours, 𝑡𝑡 = 1 hour and 
scenarios of 5, 10, 15, and 20 node microgrid networks. Unless otherwise noted, trading results 
for each scenario are similar and congruent, and samplings of results from selected scenarios are 
reported for brevity. 
Using equations (6) and (7), microgrids participating in energy trading successfully 
adjusted their bid prices, executing a total of 216 contracts for a total of 419.63 kW of traded 
power during for the scenario of a 10 node microgrid network, whereas 456 successful contracts 
were executed with a total traded power of 937.17 kW for the scenario of a 20 node microgrid 
network. A graphical representation of each executed contracts for the case of 10 microgrids is 
depicted in Fig. 4.1, where the blue line represents the hourly total amount of traded power. The 
vertical bars show the accumulation of contracts in each hour, where each colored section of a 
bar represents a separate contract and the size of the section representing the amount of energy 
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traded in the contract. Table 4.1 details the data obtained from simulation for the scenario of 20 
microgrids, showing the amount of power traded in each formed contract over the 24-hour 
period. A similar table of data with the results for the scenario of 10 microgrids was used to 
generate fig. 4, and conversely a similar figure could be generated for the scenario of 20 
microgrids using the data from Table 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1 number of executed contracts and amount of traded power in the case of 10 
interconnected microgrid system 
Fig. 4.2 shows an example of the progressive price adjustments of a buyer and seller 
negotiating an energy contract. In this sample, the desired buyer (microgrid 2) and seller 
(microgrid 5) adjust their prices according to (6) and (7) over successive contract matching 
rounds for one contract. It can be clearly seen that the seller decreases their asking price after 
each round (blue line), while the buyer increases their offered purchase price after each round 
(red line), with a contract match occurring at a price of $0.198/kW. According to the agreed 
upon market conditions, the seller offered their initial selling price at a value of $0.25/kW, and 
buyer sets their initial price to $0.15/kW. With the price of the buyer lower than the price of the 
seller, there is no match in the first round. In the second round the seller decreases their price to 
$0.2329/kW according to (6), and the buyer increases their price to $0.175/kW according to (7). 
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However, there was still no contract price match. Similarly in the third round the seller decreases 
their price to $0.215/kW and buyer increases their price to $0.2/kW with no contract match. 
Finally, in the fourth round the seller reduces their price to $0.198/kW, and the buyer increases 
their price to $0.225/kW. Hence, a contract is executed at the offerd seller price of $0.198/kW 
(for an exchange of 1.69 kW) since the seller price is now less than the buyer price. 
 














Table 4.1. Amount of power traded (kW) in each executed contract for the 24-hour time horizon 
Contract no 
Hour 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 3.67 0.83 1.87 1.08 0.41 0.24 2.9 0.02 2.28 0.32 7.59 2.55 1.84 1.3 0.1 0.36 3.27 5.64 3.4 
2 3.2 0.15 0.77 1.93 0.19 0.5 0.99 2.78 1.96 0.88 2.56 1.09 0.49 4.2 1.97 0.22 2.26 0.31 1.92 
3 1.67 3.13 3.07 1.3 2.8 0.17 0.43 0.63 0.74 0.73 0.41 4.93 0.26 0.73 2.76 1.96 0.59 2.84 3.03 
4 0.22 2.81 1.05 0.56 1.79 0.18 3.38 1.53 0.62 5.52 1.92 2.35 3.56 0.37 0.3 1.19 2.42 1.77 8.54 
5 1.77 3.67 2.12 0.47 1.9 3.18 0.16 0.17 0.18 2.92 1.83 1.36 1.37 1.98 4.06 5.36 7.24 9.57 4.97 
6 2.44 1.13 2.6 0.32 0.09 1.09 2.7 0.14 1.47 5.5 0.08 0.2 1.21 0.33 0.15 1.98 1.18 5.28 3.56 
7 2.05 0.46 1.23 0.44 0.72 0.24 1.73 1.73 1.02 1.01 2.41 1.02 0.06 1.68 0.9 1.03 2.06 4.21 1.83 
8 0.74 0.85 0.52 2.69 0.32 1.68 4.05 0.85 3.09 1.69 2.14 0.56 3.23 1.03 0.46 0.27 1.32 4.74 4.05 
9 0.82 2.98 0.93 2.34 0.88 0.74 0.16 2.9 0.14 0.63 2.93 1.67 0.32 0.06 2.01 0.88 0.82 0.15 7.04 
10 4.06 0.6 2.02 3.3 1.61 1.45 2.43 1 0.31 1.99 1.77 2.53 3.7 2.7 1.47 0.4 0.9 5.15 3.45 
11 3.29 0.05 2.32 0.54 6.15 1.84 0.13 1.93 0.58 3.07 0.29 6.07 1.01 1.73 4.07 0.37 1.97 3.8 5.83 
12 1.18 2.36 0.07 2.6 3.49 0.32 0.63 2.19 1.62 1.68 0.43 0.72 5.85 0.85 4.32 6 3.5 0.81 3.97 
13 1.89 2.46 1.89 0.07 1.91 1.27 3.48 3.82 1.05 0.79 1.85 0.09 1 1.82 0.96 5.87 3.24 4.51 2.03 
14 2.96 2.32 4.22 0.82 0.44 2.14 2.57 1.01 1.01 1.01 0.16 0.36 0.03 0.86 1.71 2.54 0.97 4.46 2.66 
15 0.79 1.01 3.24 2.96 3.05 0.46 1.1 1.41 0.02 0.03 0.46 1.67 3.08 1.54 4.83 1.23 0.71 4.38 6.46 
16 0.67 2.18 2.09 1.08 1.29 0.51 0.54 3.61 0.1 1.88 0.38 0.04 0.63 2.09 0.24 8.49 4.89 6.5 2.24 
17 0.91 2 0.21 0.43 1.55 1.68 3.1 0.42 3.54 2.2 1.44 6.29 0.7 6.5 5.39 6.47 1.77 3.09 3.22 
18 2.85 2.53 0.01 4.97 0.62 1.22 2.62 3.1 3.04 1.31 2.75 0.49 1.93 0.27 1.84 0.5 6.19 1.91 1.25 
19 2.25 2.39 0.45 0.49 0.01 0.07 0.01 6.68 0.9 0.19 4.22 0.83 0.79 0.47 4.04 2.17 0.6 0.37 3.61 
20 2.32 3.67 0.87 3.12 1.81 1.14 0.81 5.26 0.13 0.12 1.34 1.07 3.69 0.63 4.46 0.26 1.08 4.49 0.5 
21 7.13 0.13 0.94 3.31 0.35 2.49 0.04 3.3 2.03 0.17 1.85 0.66 5.01 2.22 0.07 4.73 2.16 0.07 1.43 
22 4.03 1.39 3.87 0.43 2.65 1.68 2.72 4.92 1.94 6.22 1.48 0.59 3.48 1.34 0.3 7.14 2.69 1.78 4.66 
23 0.37 3.92 1.1 3.06 0.14 2.52 0.96 1.16 6.06 1.74 7.77 6.01 7.01 0.47 4.18 0.67 0.13 0.72 3.8 




Since each instance of offering a price and executing a contract is a discrete 
computational task, the average computation time required to complete discrete tasks required to 
execute a final contract are reported for a varying number of microgrids in the network, as shown 
in Fig. 4.3.  The average computation time to execute all contracts in the case of 20 microgrids is 
found to be less than one second (around 15.25 ms), which demonstrates the time efficiency of 
the proposed trading model. It can also be noted that the average contract matching time 
increases with the increase in the number of microgrids in the network in a nearly linear 
relationship. This is because with an increase in the number of microgrids in the network, the 
amount of traded contracts increases accordingly. The linearity of the increase in contract 
negotiation time shows that the proposed trading model is easily scalable for differing numbers 
of microgrids. This is also depicted in  Fig. 4.4, which shows a similarly linear relationship 
between the number of formed contracts and the number of interconnected microgrids. 
 
Figure 4.3. Variation in the computation time with respect to the change of the number of 




Figure 4.4. Variation in the number of executed contracts with respect to the change of the 
number of microgrids in the network 
It was found that the model has successfully incentivized efficient energy trading among 
islanded networked microgrids, primarily to satisfy outstanding net loads, and secondarily to 
obtain the economic benefit of trading at a negotiated price. Each microgrid with power deficit 
successfully purchased power to meet demands while microgrids with power surplus sold off 
their excess power hence, demand-generation balance for the islanded interconnected system has 
been achieved and the costs associated with load shedding and power curtailment have been 
avoided. 
After all contract negotiations have been finalized, the details of each contract are 
recorded as blocks, verified using a novel two-phase consensus mechanism, and placed on a 
contract records blockchain. Each validated block in the chain contains (i) buyer and seller 
identification IDs, (ii) the amount of power being traded, (iii) a transaction price expressed in 
$/kW, (iv) the timestamp of the execution of the transaction, and (v) an alpha-numeric string 
called a hash, which is taken from the previous block on the blockchain. A sample of data 




Figure 4.5. A sample of generated blocks containing contract data 
In order to investigate the impact of the number of microgrids in the network on the 
validation time required for the proposed consensus method, the validation time is measured as 
the time elapsed between transaction submission and block confirmation. The average validation 
time for the validation method was calculated for an increasing number of microgrids, as shown 
in Fig. 4.6. It can be observed that the validation time increases accordingly (approximately a 
linear increase rate) with the increase in the number of networked microgrids. This is due to the 
fact that with an increase in the number of microgrids in the network, there is a corresponding 
increase in the number of executed contracts (see Fig. 4.4), which results in a longer validation 
period. The validation time required to validate all created blocks in a 20 microgrids network is 




Figure 4.6. The change in average validation time with respect to the change of the number of 
microgrids in the network 
To ensure the effectiveness of the proposed model, the obtained results were compared 
with the results of recent work proposed in [21] and [61]. Table 4.2 depicts the full comparison, 
which demonstrates the time efficiency or the proposed energy trading model (less negotiation 
time for the same number of nodes, and improvement in the success rate of the transaction, 
where all deficit and surplus power is satisfied). 
It was found that the proposed method is time efficient compared to more traditional 
methods that applies a direct price negotiation between peers. In traditional direct price 
negotiation methods, both negotiators are fully dedicated to take advantage of the offered 
contracts by the other peer and bring the other peer closer to their offered price. This increases 
the contract determination computation time and might lead to unsuccessful negotiation process, 
which can cause a reliability problem when the grid back up is absent for islanded networked 
microgrids. To provide a brief comparison of the proposed negotiation method with a commonly 
used game theory-based developed algorithm in the literature, the results of the proposed method 
are compared with the result of the two algorithms proposed in [61]. In the case of 20 
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interconnected microgrids, the results in [61] show an average convergence times of 0.025 sec, 
and 0.05 sec, respectively. However, the negotiation method proposed in this thesis offers a 
shorter negotiation time of 0.0155 sec for the same number of microgrids as shown in Fig. 4.3, 
which demonstrates the time efficiency of the proposed energy trading model. 
Table 4.2. Validation of obtained results in comparison to results from the literature 
Comparison Aspects Proposed Model  The Model Proposed in [21] 
Computation time for 
contract determination 
10 ms for six nodes system ~14 ms for six nodes system 
(700 ms for 300 nodes) 
Consensus protocol Less energy and time-
consuming protocol based 
on pBFT and modified 
PoS  
Utilizes a time-consuming 
consensus method contains three 
components: contract-chain, 
ledger-chain, and a high 
frequency verification module 
that requires all nodes to solve 
puzzle problems and vote for 
verification (validation time is not 
reported).  
Comparison aspect Proposed model The model proposed in [61] 
Transaction negotiation time 
(Average convergence time) 
0.0115 sec for 20 node 
system 
Algorithm 1: 0.025 sec for 20 
node system 
Algorithm 2: 0.05 sec for 20 node 
system 
 
With regard to justifying the fast validation time of our proposed consensus method, the 
work in [62] confirms that in networked computer systems a pBFT algorithm can be executed in 
the order of milliseconds. Furthermore, in the modified proof of stake algorithm being proposed 
in the second phase of the consensus process, the stake is calculated automatically based on pre-
existing data without a pre-determined time constraint. Therefore, the PoS algorithm does not 
significantly impact the validation time. 
It is also worth mentioning that although there are many advantages to pBFT-based 
consensus, it has been categorized as communication bound, hence it has a scalability issue when 
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utilized for networks with a very large number of nodes. To overcome these limits without 
sacrificing safety, the method proposed in [63] includes an approach to partition large networks 
into smaller groups called federates; thus resulting in an improved scalability up to 1000 nodes 
[53]. 
4.2 Grid Connected Operation – Multiagent Models 
4.2.1 Model I 
The scheduling problem is modeled as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP) 
optimization problem using IBM CPLEX 12.7, and the energy trading model was simulated for a 
case of 7 networked microgrids using Python 3.6. The generation and load data were modified 
from compiled wind energy and load data for 7 interconnected microgrids with an average 
installed renewable energy capacity of 7.5 MW for each microgrid. Each microgrid is equipped 
with a dispatchable generator with a fuel cost of 61.3 $/MW [64]. The maximum power 
generation per round for the dispatchable generator was assumed to be 0.15 MW. Each microgrid 
is additionally equipped with a battery storage system with a charge and discharge cost of 70 
$/MW [64]. The maximum charging limit per round is considered to be 0.3 MW. The maximum 
capacity of the tie line connecting each microgrid with the utility grid is considered to be 0.5 
MW. A 24-hour dynamic energy price for solving the scheduling optimization problem is 
adopted as shown in Fig. 4.7 [65]. The cost of load shedding and renewable energy curtailment is 
assumed to be 1,000 $/MW.  
After solving the local scheduling problem for a group of seven networked microgrids, 
there was a total excess load of 18.92 MW (positive net load) and an excess generation of -16.97 
(negative net load) over the 24-hour time horizon. Fig. 4.8 shows the total net load to be traded 
for each time interval. The trading model is then simulated for each hour in the day ahead 24-
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hour time horizon. The total amount of power traded over the 24-hour period was 8.85 MW, 
distributed over 58 contracts. The maximum power traded in a single contract was 0.56 MW 
exchanged at 2:00 am, while the minimum power traded in a single contract was 0.0018 MW 
exchanged at 3:00 am. Fig. 4.9 shows the amount of deficit power in each hour that was satisfied 
by the trading model (labelled in orange). Since there is more deficit power than excess power, 
not all deficit power is satisfied, where the remaining deficit power will be curtailed.  
 
Figure 4.7. 24-hour dynamic energy prices 
 




Figure 4.9. Amount of deficit power vs satisfied deficit power resulting from the peer-to-peer 
trading model 
The model has successfully facilitated efficient energy trading among the networked 
microgrids, and  reduced the amount of curtailed power, hence, the costs associated with load 
shedding and power curtailment have been reduced. It should be noted that almost all deficit 
power is satisfied through energy trading for early morning hours, namely 2:00 am through 6:00 
am and afternoon hours 11:00 am through 8:00 pm. Conversely, in the morning hours from 7:00 
am to 10:00 am and nighttime hours from 9:00 pm to 12:00 midnight, there is insufficient excess 
generation available to satisfy the demand during these periods. This result correlates well with 
Fig. 4.8, where the total net load of the microgrid network was largely positive (deficit power) in 
the later morning and night, and negative (excess power) in the early morning and mid-day 
through the evening. We can conclude from Fig. 4.9 that, when excess generation is available, 
the proposed trading model is effective to satisfy all deficit net load. It is also worth noting that 
no contracts were executed at 9:00 am, which was a result of no excess generation being 
available in the marketplace during that hour. The total cost of energy trading in the 24-hour 
period was $321.78, with the average contract price of 36 $/MW and average cost of a contract 
at $5.55. The maximum contract price was 63.98 $/MW executed at 3:00 pm, while the 
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minimum contract price was 16.13 $/MW executed at 2:00 am. Fig. 4.10 shows a comparison 
between the final contract trading price and the dynamic utility price. This comparison shows 
that, even without limiting the upper bound of the negotiated price, the pricing mechanism 
consistently arrives at a price close to the utility price at each hour, indicating that the pricing 
mechanism used in the trading model is fair for both buyers and sellers. 
 
Figure 4.10. Comparison of the model trading price to the utility price 
Fig. 4.11 shows an example of the price adjustment of marketplace participants during 
hour 2. During this hour, two sellers offered contracts in the marketplace, seller 1 having 0.64 
MW excess power and seller 2 having 0.157 MW excess power. Two buyers attempted to satisfy 
their loads by purchasing energy from the marketplace, with buyer 1 having a 0.12 MW deficit 
and buyer 2 having a 0.599 MW deficit. The initial selling prices offered were 31.19 $/MW for 
seller 1 and 27.88 $/MW for seller 2. Initial buying prices were set at 21.77 $/MW for buyer 1 
and 18.27 $/MW for buyer 2. No contract matches occurred in the first round, so each participant 
adjusted their price for a second round. During the second trading round, buyer 1 matched with 
seller 2 and a contract was executed which sold 0.12 MW to buyer 1 at a price of 20.91 $/MW. 
This contract fully satisfied the load of buyer 1 and reduced the available power for sale from 
seller 2 to 0.036 MW. Because buyer 1 was no longer participating in the trading and seller 2 still 
had the lowest available contract price, buyer 2 also matched with seller 2, exchanging the 
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remaining excess energy of 0.036 from seller 2 at the same selling price. Since buyer 2 still had 
an unsatisfied load of 0.56 MW, they also match with seller 1 at a price of 23.39 $/MW. A 
contract was executed and fully satisfied the demand of buyer 2. Since Seller 1 still has a 
remining excess power and there are no buyers during this hour, seller 1 curtailed the remaining 
excess power of 0.076 MW. 
 
Figure 4.11. An example of price adjustment process of two buyers and two sellers 
After all contract negotiations have been finalized, the details of each contract are 
recorded as blocks, verified using the proposed two-phase consensus mechanism, and placed on 
a contract records blockchain. Similarly, as with the simulation in section 4.1, each validated 
block in the chain contains (i) buyer and seller identification IDs, (ii) the amount of power being 
traded, (iii) a transaction price expressed in $/MW, (iv) the timestamp of the execution of the 
transaction, and (v) an alpha-numeric hash, which is taken from the previous block on the 




Figure 4.12. A sample of generated blocks containing contract data 
For grid-connected operation model I, the test system consisted of a 7-node microgrid 
network. The proposed blockchain settlement protocol was simulated for a system of this size, 
and it was found that the average validation time for a single block in this system was 0.705 
seconds, or 705 ms. 
4.2.2 Model II 
The same scheduling problem, under the same parameters detailed in section 3.2.1, is 
utilized for the second non-islanded trading model. After solving the local scheduling problem 
for the seven microgrid network, there was a total excess load of 18.92 MW (positive net load) 
and an excess generation of -16.91 (negative net load) over the 24-hour time horizon. Again Fig. 




Figure 4.13. Comparison of energy deficit to traded energy 
The trading model is then simulated each hour in a day ahead 24-hour time horizon. It 
was found that the model has successfully facilitated efficient energy trading among the 
networked microgrids and reduced the amount of curtailed power. Thus, the proposed model 
improves the operation cost of each microgrid by reducing the high costs associated with load 
shedding and power curtailment. The total amount of power traded over the 24-hour period was 
found to be 9.26 MW, distributed over 59 contracts. The maximum power traded in a single 
contract was 0.599 MW exchanged at hour 2 while the minimum power traded in a single 
contract was found to be 0.0005 MW (0.5 kW) exchanged at hour 8. Fig. 4.12 shows the amount 
of deficit power in each hour that was satisfied by the trading model (labelled in orange). 
 
Figure 4.14. Comparison of the model trading price to utility price 
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The total cost of energy trading in the 24-hour period was $433.17, with the average 
contract price of 47.59 $/MW and average cost of a contract at $8.33. The maximum contract 
price was 74.63 $/MW executed at hour 15, while the minimum contract price was 21.63 $/MW 
executed at hour 3. Fig. 4.13 shows a comparison between the final contract trading price and the 
dynamic utility price. Looking to this figure, it is clear that the proposed model facilitates the 
trading of contracts at prices close to the utility price, indicating that the pricing mechanism used 
in the trading model is fair for both buyers and sellers. 
Fig. 4.14 shows an example of the price adjustment of marketplace participants during 
hour 19. During this hour, two sellers offered contracts in the marketplace, seller 1 having 
0.4179 MW excess power and seller 2 having 0.3744 MW excess power. Two buyers attempted 
to satisfy their loads by purchasing energy from the marketplace, with buyer 1 having a 0.2467 
MW deficit and buyer 2 having a 0.1468 MW deficit. The initial selling prices offered were 
69.39 $/MW for seller 1 and 68.73 $/MW for seller 2. Initial buying prices were set at 48.23 
$/MW for buyer 1 and 50.16 $/MW for buyer 2. No contract matches occurred in the first 10 
rounds, so each participant adjusted their price incrementally to attempt to execute a contract. 
During the 11th  trading round, buyer 1 matched with seller 2 and a contract was executed which 
sold 0.2467 MW to buyer 1 at a price of 67.23 $/MW. This contract fully satisfied the load of 
buyer 1 and reduced the available power for sale from seller 2 to 0.1277 MW. Because buyer 1 
fully satisfied their load deficit, they no longer participated in subsequent trading rounds. 
Additionally, since no other prices matched in round 11, price adjustments continued until round 
16 when buyer 2 matched prices with seller 1. The executed contract traded 0.1468 MW to buyer 
2 at a price of 66.84 $/MW, fully satisfying the load deficit of buyer 2 a leaving seller 1 with a 
remaining excess of 0.2711 MW. Since both seller 1 and seller 2 still have remining excess 
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power and there are no more buyers participating on the marketplace for this hour, seller 1 is 
forced to curtail their remaining excess power of 0.2711 MW and seller 2 is forced to curtail 
their remaining excess power of 0.1277 MW. 
 
Figure 4.15. An example of price adjustment process of two buyers and two sellers 
For hours in which all excess energy was sold in the marketplace but there still existed an 
energy deficit with the final buyer, a final contract was executed utilizing the spinning reserve 
energy of the final seller. For this contract, the amount of energy sold could not exceed 20% of 
the final seller’s net load, according to equations (29) and (30) from section 3.2.3. In total, 13 
reserve energy contracts were executed over the 24-hour simulation which traded 0.359 MW of 
spinning reserve energy, at an average of 7.33 kW of spinning reserve energy traded per contract. 
Each of these contracts was executed at the designated spinning reserve price of 63 $/MW, with 
the total cost of spinning reserve contracts being $22.63, for an average contract cost of $0.45. 
The results shown in Fig. 4.15 show the total amount of traded power for each hour in the 24-
hour time horizon, and highlights the contribution of spinning reserve power in each hour where 
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a spinning reserve contract was executed. As can be seen in the figure, spinning reserve contracts 
(highlighted in red) contributed to the traded energy in 13 of 24 hours. 
 
Figure 4.16. Total energy traded in each hour, including primary and spinning reserve 
power 
After all contract negotiations have been finalized, the details of each contract are 
recorded as blocks, verified using the proposed two-phase consensus mechanism, and placed on 
a contract records blockchain. Similarly, as with the simulation in section 4.1, each validated 
block in the chain contains (i) buyer and seller identification IDs, (ii) the amount of power being 
traded, (iii) a transaction price expressed in $/MW, (iv) the timestamp of the execution of the 
transaction, and (v) an alpha-numeric hash, which is taken from the previous block on the 
blockchain. A sample of two sequentially generated blocks is shown in Fig. 4.12. Whereas Fig. 
4.14 shows a sample of generated block for the spinning reserve contract (Block 2). The block 
contains (i) buyer and seller identification IDs, (ii) the amount of power being traded using the 
seller spinning reserve in MW and as percentage of the seller excess power, (iii) a transaction 
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price expressed in $/MW, (iv) the timestamp of the execution of the transaction, and (v) an 
alpha-numeric hash, which is taken from the previous block on the blockchain. 
 
Figure 4.17. A sample of generated blocks containing contract data 
 








In this work, multiple Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading mechanisms for groups of both 
islanded and grid-connected microgrid networks are proposed. Additionally, a two-stage 
blockchain-based energy transaction settlement protocol is developed to ensure the security of 
the energy trading transactions. Simulation results show that all of the proposed electricity 
trading mechanisms can efficiently facilitate energy trading between networked microgrids. The 
conclusion of this work can be summarized as follows: 
• In the case of islanded interconnected microgrids, simulation results showed that 
the proposed energy trading model and price adjustment mechanism effectively 
facilitated fair energy transactions between microgrids in a cost and time efficient 
manner. The proposed model ensured grid network reliability by ensuring the 
satisfaction of the deficit and excess power of all trading participants. 
• In the case of grid-connected microgrid networks, simulation results showed that 
the proposed energy trading models and price adjustment mechanisms effectively 
facilitated energy trading and assured price fairness for all trading participants. 
The optimization problem formulation and price adjustment mechanisms assured 
minimum operation cost for each microgrid in the network. 
• The novel two-phase blockchain-based transaction settlement protocol promoted 
system security and records immutability through the use of a two-stage 
consensus protocol. Simulation results showed that the proposed consensus 




5.1 Future Work 
Further research which can be undertaken to extend the conducted work may include: 
• Improving the scalability of the proposed consensus protocol by partitioning a 
large network into smaller networks (federates) as proposed in [63]. 
• Simulation of the proposed energy trading models utilizing different and more 
comprehensive generation and load data collected from an operational microgrid 
network. 
• A unified energy trading and price adjustment mechanism for both islanded and 
grid-connected operation which includes specific considerations for energy 
trading during transitions between islanded and grid-connected operation. 
• Development of new hybrid two-phase consensus protocols that combines pBFT 
with different consensus methods such as Proof of Authority and Proof of Work. 
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Table B.1. Net load of each microgrid (10 microgrid scenario) from randomly generated data for 
islanded operation 
  Microgrid No. 

















1 2.18 -7.51 2.21 1.21 5.98 1.15 -3.91 2.23 -0.75 -5.69 
2 0.88 3.74 8.5 -4.95 -1.44 -6.5 -0.43 0.34 5.51 -8.23 
3 -7.16 0.48 3.91 -1.25 4.61 -3.12 0.14 -3.81 -8.65 0.47 
4 0.34 8.59 -3.08 -2.48 2.45 -3.24 5.08 0.17 3.58 -6.34 
5 -3.59 0.41 1.4 0.19 0.86 6.72 -8.17 -2.28 -0.03 -0.72 
6 4.4 -2.97 -1.28 1.07 -2.67 -0.87 4.89 -2.55 4.54 0.95 
7 -0.42 6.22 4.26 -0.27 -1.75 -3.64 3.1 0.4 7.84 -1.56 
8 0.27 2 -4.05 5.07 -4.15 3.37 -4.46 -3.8 -6.12 1.97 
9 -1.16 -0.25 -3.84 0.61 0.6 0.96 0.3 6.36 -1.02 -3.05 
10 -1.65 3.51 -1.67 1 0.77 -4.13 -2.69 -4 1.86 1.4 
11 8.49 -1.88 3.94 2.12 -5.51 6.71 4.53 -2.29 -4.02 -1.39 
12 4.12 -1.94 -5.15 -0.73 6.36 7.96 4.47 4.09 0.55 0.02 
13 -1.33 6.55 4.46 -1.52 -2.8 9.06 6.7 -2.16 -6.71 -3.95 
14 8.9 1.82 -3.42 -6.31 -3.17 5.23 0.04 -1.9 -5.29 -2.22 
15 -4.05 -5.41 -7.13 -0.77 3.26 -0.74 7.02 4.39 -5.48 1.08 
16 6.39 7.69 4.74 -0.8 8.03 5.73 0.83 -4.34 8.23 2.3 
17 -0.72 -6.01 8.34 2.63 6.25 1.09 4.96 -8.16 -0.67 2.78 
18 -2.53 -2.12 -0.87 2.56 6.81 -2.43 1.13 -0.24 6.15 1.24 
19 -8.36 -1.38 -4.57 1.68 -0.41 2.67 -6.94 -1.37 3.68 3.44 
20 -5.59 4.79 -9.37 -2.27 -0.2 -2.4 -3.81 -3.62 4.28 -0.97 
21 0.46 1.53 -1.42 -1.06 7.03 -1.19 -5.74 -1.45 0.77 -2.47 
22 -0.6 -0.18 8.38 8.4 4.68 2.82 3.45 -6.24 -2.55 -2.57 
23 0.06 -4.46 4.57 8.3 1.92 -5.62 -5.43 -2.19 -1.75 -2.71 





Table B.2. Microgrid net load data used for grid-connected operation 
 
 Microgrid No. 

















1 -1.0879 1.0658 1.2812 -0.9228 -0.2915 -0.6728 0.7178 
2 -1.4392 0.8188 1.0711 -1.1416 -0.4007 -0.9571 0.6673 
3 -1.1819 0.5483 0.8841 -1.1714 -0.4100 -1.0842 0.7177 
4 -0.8322 0.8929 0.6810 -1.3023 -0.4534 -1.1884 0.6878 
5 -0.9556 0.9716 0.8356 -1.3251 -0.3995 -0.9503 0.7179 
6 -0.9376 1.0173 0.7609 -1.2164 -0.6946 -1.0951 0.6406 
7 -0.8374 0.8963 0.9494 -1.0277 -0.3048 -0.6898 0.8310 
8 -0.6112 1.0060 1.3298 -0.9043 -0.1632 -0.8024 0.9565 
9 -0.4116 1.0337 1.2967 -1.1386 -0.0706 -0.4902 1.0514 
10 -0.3749 0.8225 1.1505 -1.1760 -0.1092 -0.6339 1.0156 
11 -0.6009 0.7378 1.2809 -1.2022 -0.3865 -0.8644 0.8634 
12 -1.0991 0.6847 1.7097 -0.9516 -0.2279 -0.6570 0.6802 
13 -1.1278 0.7894 1.6098 -1.0136 -0.2469 -0.7014 0.6679 
14 -1.1242 0.9071 1.4907 -1.3214 -0.2169 -0.6001 0.6581 
15 -0.8272 1.0511 1.3826 -1.4349 -0.1821 -0.5341 0.6617 
16 -0.9168 1.0542 1.1904 -1.6089 -0.3698 -0.5695 0.6822 
17 -0.5412 1.0832 1.0112 -1.7098 -0.4226 -0.4706 0.8817 
18 -0.6536 1.0284 0.8279 -1.5350 -0.4731 -0.9744 1.0521 
19 -0.4008 1.1967 0.8238 -1.5868 -0.3744 -0.4901 1.0968 
20 -0.5076 0.9942 1.0032 -1.5441 -0.6827 -0.4383 1.0871 
21 -0.6829 1.1671 1.3144 -1.3794 -0.0839 -0.5612 1.1353 
22 -0.9986 1.1823 1.7851 -1.0688 -0.0947 -0.7355 1.0267 
23 -1.4259 1.0406 1.4382 -0.9938 -0.2752 -0.9514 0.9374 







C.1. Simulation Code for Islanded Operation 




import datetime as date 
from openpyxl import Workbook 
 
 
filename = "blockchain_test123.xlsx" 
workbook = Workbook() 
sheet = workbook.active 
 
cost_batt = 30/1000 
cost_shed = 1000/1000 
cost_reserve = 250/1000 
cost_trans = 0.0000028 
t=1 
 
A = ([[0, 10.2, 14.5, 149.7, 162, 171.1, 50.3, 21.6, 175, 178.2, 182.3, 75, 
184.3, 119.6, 87.6, 128, 155.2, 191, 66.2, 81],  
      [10.2, 0, 17.9, 159.2, 171.9, 183.4, 60.1, 17, 183.2, 188.3, 192, 85.6, 
197.2, 131, 54.3, 31.6, 105.2, 142.5, 151, 162.2], 
      [14.5, 17.9, 0, 165.3, 177, 185.3, 5.6, 24.8, 186.8, 193.5, 196, 91.7, 
202.9, 135.2, 62.2, 51, 107, 127.6, 191, 88.1], 
      [149.7, 159.2, 165.3, 0, 12.1, 220.5, 102.6, 175, 22.7, 27.1, 231.5, 
125.2, 234.9, 172, 44.1, 191.5, 34, 202.3, 198, 215.1], 
      [162, 171.9, 177, 12.1, 0, 232, 112.2, 187.3, 34.8, 39.3, 242.6, 137, 
247.5, 182.4, 22, 161.6, 124.2, 155, 104.5, 74.1], 
      [171.1, 183.4, 185.3, 220.5, 232, 0, 122.4, 95.9, 242, 247.7, 10.2, 
145.6, 15, 192.1, 149.5, 86, 101.1, 62.5, 25, 36.2], 
      [50.3, 60.1, 5.6, 102.6, 112.2, 122.4, 0, 75.2, 122.3, 127.8, 130.5, 
25, 135.9, 70.4, 178.2, 61.5, 140.2, 32, 73, 197.3], 
      [21.6, 17, 24.8, 175, 187.3, 95.9, 75.2, 0, 197.1, 202.3, 205.7, 100.4, 
213.8, 145, 121.1, 167.5, 55, 31.4, 232.1, 14], 
      [175, 183.2, 186.8, 22.7, 34.8, 242, 122.3, 197.1, 0, 36.2, 252.3, 
147.6, 257, 192.9, 165.5, 71, 41.4, 127.7, 182, 52.3], 
      [178.2, 188.3, 193.5, 27.1, 39.3, 247.7, 127.8, 202.3, 36.2, 0, 257, 
152.4, 262.6, 197, 165.2, 77.7, 23.1, 112, 182.5, 69.2], 
      [182.3, 192, 196, 231.5, 242.6, 10.2, 130.5, 205.7, 252.3, 257, 0, 
155.1, 15.9, 204.7, 68.4, 121.5, 182, 20.6, 142.2, 40], 
      [75, 85.6, 91.7, 125.2, 137, 145.6, 25, 100.4, 147.6, 152.4, 155.1, 0, 
160.5, 95.1, 150.2, 217.5, 49.2, 108.6, 82, 77.4], 
      [184.3, 197.2, 202.9, 234.9, 247.5, 15, 135.9, 213.8, 257, 262.6, 15.9, 
160.5, 0, 205.7, 188.2, 62.4, 89, 124.5, 160.1, 98.8], 
      [119.6, 131, 135.2, 172, 182.4, 192.1, 70.4, 145, 192.9, 197, 204.7, 
95.1, 205.7, 0, 66.5, 221.4, 155.2, 181.3, 25, 98.2], 
      [87.6, 54.3, 62.2, 44.1, 22, 149.5, 178.2, 121.1, 165.5, 165.2, 68.4, 
150.2, 188.2, 66.5, 0, 114.8, 202.2, 158.2, 76, 185.2], 
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      [128, 31.6, 51, 191.5, 161.6, 86, 61.5, 167.5, 71, 77.7, 121.5, 217.5, 
62.4, 221.4, 114.8, 0,19.5, 171.2, 207, 75], 
      [155.2, 105.2, 107, 34, 124.2, 101.1, 140.2, 55, 41.4, 23.1, 182, 49.2, 
89, 155.2, 202.2, 19.5, 0, 132.2, 168.4, 63], 
      [191, 142.5, 127.6, 202.3, 155, 62.5, 32, 31.4, 127.7, 112, 220.6, 
108.6, 124.5, 181.3, 158.2, 171.2, 132.2, 0, 212.4, 78.4], 
      [66.2, 151, 191, 198, 104.5, 25, 73, 232.1, 182, 182.5, 142.2, 82, 
160.1, 25, 76, 207, 168.4, 212.4, 0, 185.2], 
      [81, 162.2, 88.1, 215.1, 74.1, 36.2, 197.3, 14, 52.3, 69.2, 40, 77.4, 




  def __init__(self, index, timestamp, data, previous_hash): 
    self.index = index 
    self.timestamp = timestamp 
    self.data = data 
    self.previous_hash = previous_hash 
    self.hash = self.hash_block() 
   
  def hash_block(self): 
      sha = hasher.sha256() 
      sha.update((str(self.index) + str(self.timestamp) + str(self.data) + 
str(self.previous_hash)).encode()) 
      return sha.hexdigest() 
 
def create_genesis_block(): 
  # Manually construct a block with 
  # index zero and arbitrary previous hash 
  return Block(0, date.datetime.now(), "Genesis Block", "0") 
 
def next_block(last_block): 
  this_index = last_block.index + 1 
  this_timestamp = date.datetime.now() 
  this_data = "kW:" + str(kW) + " Price:" + str(price_seller) + " Time:" 
+time 
  this_hash = last_block.hash 
  return Block(this_index, this_timestamp, this_data, this_hash) 
 
class Prosumer(): 
    def __init__(self, index, pgen, pload, pnet, status): 
        self.index = index 
        self.pgen = pgen 
        self.pload = pload 
        self.pnet = pnet 
        self.status = status 
      
# Create the blockchain and add the genesis block 
blockchain = [create_genesis_block()] 
previous_block = blockchain[0] 
temp_buyer = [] 
temp_seller = [] 
alpha = 0 
beta = 0 
gamma = 0 
average = 0 
phi = 1 
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# How many blocks should we add to the chain 
# after the genesis block 




pgensum = 0 
ploadsum = 0 
while(y < num_of_blocks_to_add): 
    genlist = list() 
    loadlist = list() 
    netlist = list() 
    conlist = list() 
    prodlist = list() 
    prosumers = list() 
    producers = list() 
    consumers = list() 
 
    for k in range(1, 20): 
        pgen = round(random.uniform(5,15), 2) 
        genlist.append(pgen) 
        pload = round(random.uniform(5,15), 2) 
        loadlist.append(pload) 
        pnet = round(pload-pgen, 2) 
        netlist.append(pnet) 
        if(pgen > pload): 
            status = 1 
        else: 
            status = 0 
        prosumers.append(Prosumer(k, pgen, pload, pnet, status)) 
 
    sum3 = sum(netlist) 
    print(sum3) 
    if(sum3 > 0): 
        prosumers.append(Prosumer(20, 0, sum3, -sum3, 1)) 
    else: 
        prosumers.append(Prosumer(20, sum3, 0, 0-sum3, 0)) 
     
    
    phi += 1 
    for i in range(0, len(prosumers)): 
        print("Prosumer: {}".format(prosumers[i].index)) 
        print("Pgen: {}".format(prosumers[i].pgen)) 
        print("Pload: {}".format(prosumers[i].pload)) 
        print("Pnet: {}".format(prosumers[i].pnet)) 
        print("Status: {}\n".format(prosumers[i].status)) 
        sheet.cell(row=i+1, column=25+phi).value = prosumers[i].pnet 
 
        if(prosumers[i].pnet > 0): 
            consumers.append(prosumers[i]) 
            conlist.append(prosumers[i].pnet) 
        else: 
            producers.append(prosumers[i]) 
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            prodlist.append(prosumers[i].pnet) 
 
    
    for i in range(0, len(consumers)): 
        print("Consumers: {}".format(consumers[i].pnet)) 
        sheet.cell(row=t, column=15).value = consumers[i].pnet 
        t+=1 
    for i in range(0, len(producers)): 
        print("Producers: {}".format(producers[i].pnet)) 
        sheet.cell(row=t, column=16).value = producers[i].pnet 
        t+=1 
 
#Negotiate contract 
    have_contract = 0 
    average = 0 
    price_retail = 0.20 
    j=0 
    for j in range(0, len(consumers)): 
        for k in range(0, len(producers)): 
            if consumers[j].pnet>0 and producers[k].pnet<0: 
                alpha = 0.01 
                beta = 0.04 
                tau = 0 
                fixed_seller = 0.25 
                fixed_buyer = 0.15 
                cost_curt = 0 
                batt_limit = 2 
                reserve_limit = 5 
                have_contract = 0 
                tasks = 0 
                gamma = 0.2 
                count = 0 
 
                while(have_contract < 1): 
                    if(count<5): 
                        if(abs(producers[k].pnet) < batt_limit): 
                            price_seller = (fixed_seller) - 
tau*(cost_batt*abs(producers[k].pnet)*gamma + alpha*cost_curt*abs(0)) + 
(A[j][k]*cost_trans*abs(producers[k].pnet)) 
                            batt_limit -= abs(producers[k].pnet) 
                            tasks += 1 
                        else: 
                            price_seller = (fixed_seller)  - 
tau*(cost_batt*abs(batt_limit) + alpha*cost_curt*abs(producers[k].pnet - 
batt_limit)) + (A[j][k]*cost_trans*abs(producers[k].pnet)) 
                            tasks +=1 
                        if(abs(consumers[j].pnet) < reserve_limit): 
                            price_buyer = (fixed_buyer) + 
tau*(beta*cost_shed*abs(0) + cost_reserve*abs(consumers[j].pnet)) 
                            reserve_limit -= consumers[j].pnet 
                            tasks +=1 
                        else: 
                            price_buyer = (fixed_buyer) + 
tau*(beta*cost_shed*abs(consumers[j].pnet - reserve_limit) + 
cost_reserve*abs(reserve_limit)) 
                            tasks += 1 
                    else: 
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                        if(abs(producers[k].pnet) < batt_limit): 
                            price_seller = (fixed_seller) - 
tau*(cost_batt*abs(producers[k].pnet)*0 + alpha*cost_curt*abs(0)) + 
(A[j][k]*cost_trans*abs(producers[k].pnet)) 
                            batt_limit -= abs(producers[k].pnet) 
                            tasks += 1 
                        else: 
                            price_seller = (fixed_seller)  - 
tau*(0*cost_batt*abs(batt_limit) + alpha*cost_curt*abs(producers[k].pnet)) + 
(A[j][k]*cost_trans*abs(producers[k].pnet)) 
                            tasks +=1 
                        if(abs(consumers[j].pnet) < reserve_limit): 
                            price_buyer = (fixed_buyer) + 
tau*(beta*cost_shed*abs(0) + 0*cost_reserve*abs(consumers[j].pnet)) 
                            reserve_limit -= consumers[j].pnet 
                            tasks +=1 
                        else: 
                            price_buyer = (fixed_buyer) + 
tau*(beta*cost_shed*abs(consumers[j].pnet) + 
0*cost_reserve*abs(reserve_limit)) 
                            tasks += 1 
                         
                    if(price_seller <= price_buyer): 
                        have_contract = 1 
                        print("Price_seller: {}".format(price_seller)) 
                        print("Price_buyer: {}".format(price_buyer)) 
                        sheet.cell(row=m, column=1).value = price_seller 
                        sheet.cell(row=n, column=2).value = price_buyer 
                        m+=1 
                        n+=1 
                        tasks += 1 
                        time = date.datetime.now().strftime('%S.%f')[:-2] 
                        sheet.cell(row=m, column=7).value = tasks 
                    else: 
                        tau = 1 
                        count += 1 
                        print("Price_seller: {}".format(price_seller)) 
                        print("Price_buyer: {}".format(price_buyer)) 
                        sheet.cell(row=m, column=1).value = price_seller 
                        sheet.cell(row=n, column=2).value = price_buyer  
                        m+=1 
                        n+=1 
                        cost_curt = price_seller 
                        fixed_seller = price_seller 
                        fixed_buyer = price_buyer 
                        tasks += 1 
                        time = date.datetime.now().strftime('%S.%f')[:-2] 
                        sheet.cell(row=m, column=7).value = tasks 
                         
 
                    sheet.cell(row=k+1, column=1).value = price_seller 
                    sheet.cell(row=k+1, column=2).value = price_buyer 
 
                sheet.cell(row=m, column=9).value = consumers[j].pnet 
                sheet.cell(row=m, column=10).value = producers[k].pnet 
                     
                if(abs(producers[k].pnet) >= abs(consumers[j].pnet)): 
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                    kW = abs(consumers[j].pnet) 
                    producers[k].pnet += consumers[j].pnet 
                    consumers[j].pnet = 0 
                else: 
                    kW = abs(producers[k].pnet) 
                    consumers[j].pnet += producers[k].pnet 
                    producers[k].pnet = 0 
 
                time = date.datetime.now().strftime('%S.%f')[:-2] 
                block_to_add = next_block(previous_block) 
                blockchain.append(block_to_add) 
                previous_block = block_to_add 
                print("Block #{} has been added to the 
blockchain!".format(block_to_add.index)) 
                print("Data: {}".format(block_to_add.data)) 
                print("Hash: {}\n".format(block_to_add.hash)) 
                sheet.cell(row=m, column=3).value = block_to_add.index 
                sheet.cell(row=m, column=4).value = block_to_add.data 
                sheet.cell(row=m, column=5).value = block_to_add.hash 
                sheet.cell(row=m, column=6).value = time 
                sheet.cell(row=m, column=7).value = tasks 
                sheet.cell(row=m, column=8).value = kW 
 
    sheet.cell(row=m, column=11).value = sum(conlist) 
    sheet.cell(row=m, column=12).value = sum(prodlist) 
 






C.2. Simulation Code for Grid-Connected Operation – Model I 
 




import numpy as np 
from openpyxl import load_workbook 
 
# ------------------------------------------------------------ 
# DATA HANDLING 
# 




ws1 = wb2["Sheet2"] 
ws2 = wb2["Sheet3"] 
sheet = wb2.active 





Load1 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load1.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=2).value)) 





Load2 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load2.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=3).value)) 





Load3 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load3.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=4).value)) 





Load4 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load4.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=5).value)) 







Load5 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load5.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=6).value)) 





Load6 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load6.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=7).value)) 





Load7 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load7.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=8).value)) 





Load8 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load8.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=9).value)) 






# GLOBAL CONSTANTS & COUNTERS 
# 
 
Cbat = 0.03 
Csh = 0.8 
Cres = 0.25 
Ckw = 0.25 
Cl = 0.08 
Cpk = 0.5 
line_limit = 1000 
Ccurt = 1000 
Cgrid = [26.84, 24.63, 21.21, 20.32, 20.14, 21.10, 24.62, 29.62, 31.94, 
37.54, 42.26, 48.08, 52.71, 59.98, 62.62, 62.99, 67.50, 64.72, 57.09, 50.41, 
47.77, 40.96, 36.71, 32.12] 
 
t=1 
r = 0 
q=0 
fp_buy = 5 
fp_sell = 25 
j=1 
 
for x in range(len(Load1)): 
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        print("Hour # {}\n".format(x+1)) 
        traders = [] 
        prod = [] 
        cons = [] 
        traders.append(Load1[x]) 
        traders.append(Load2[x]) 
        traders.append(Load3[x]) 
        traders.append(Load4[x]) 
        traders.append(Load5[x]) 
        traders.append(Load6[x]) 
        traders.append(Load7[x]) 
        traders.append(Load8[x]) 
 
        for i in range(len(traders)): 
            if(traders[i] < 0): 
                prod.append(traders[i]) 
            elif(traders[i] > 0): 
                cons.append(traders[i]) 
        print(prod) 
        print(cons) 
        alpha = 1 
        price_buy = 8 
        price_sell = 25 
        r = 1 
        q=1 
        fixed_buylist=[] 
        price_buylist=[] 
        fixed_selllist=[] 
        price_selllist=[] 
         
        while(sum(prod) != 0 and sum(cons) != 0): 
            r=1 
            q=1 
            trade = 0 
            while(sum(prod) != 0 and sum(cons) !=0): 
                for j in range(len(prod)): 
                    sale = False 
                    if(r <= 10): 
                        if(r==1): 
                            fixed_sell = (1 + 
((abs(prod[j])**(1/2))/3))*Cgrid[x] 
                            fixed_selllist.append(fixed_sell) 
                            print("Fixed_seller price: 
{}".format(round(fixed_sell, 4))) 
                            price_sell = fixed_sell - (((r-1)/(r + 
math.factorial(r)))*price_sell) 
                            price_selllist.append(price_sell) 
                            print("Seller price: {}".format(round(price_sell, 
4))) 
                        else: 
                            price_sell = price_selllist[j] - (((r-1)/(r + 
math.factorial(r)))*price_selllist[j]) 
                            price_selllist[j] = price_sell 
                            print("Seller price: {}".format(round(price_sell, 
4)))        
                for k in range(len(cons)): 
                        if(r <= 10): 
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                            if(r==1): 
                                fixed_buy = (1 - 
((abs(cons[k])**(1/2))/3))*Cgrid[x] 
                                fixed_buylist.append(fixed_buy) 
                                print("Fixed_buyer price: 
{}".format(round(fixed_buylist[k],4))) 
                                price_buy = fixed_buylist[k] + (((r-1)/(r + 
math.factorial(r)))*price_buy) 
                                price_buylist.append(price_buy) 
                                print("Buyer price: 
{}".format(round(price_buylist[k], 4)))   
                            else: 
                                price_buy = price_buylist[k] + (((r-1)/(r + 
math.factorial(r)))*price_buylist[k]) 
                                price_buylist[k] = price_buy 
                                print("Buyer price: 
{}".format(round(price_buylist[k], 4))) 
                 
                price_buylisttemp = price_buylist 
                price_buylisttemp.sort() 
                trade_price = min(price_selllist) 
                for k in range(len(price_buylisttemp)): 
                    while(price_buylisttemp[k] > trade_price): 
                        trade_price = min(price_selllist) 
                        j = price_selllist.index(min(price_selllist)) 
                        if(price_buylist[k] > trade_price and (prod[j] != 0 
and cons[k] != 0)): 
                            print("\nPresale Prod: {}".format(prod[j])) 
                            print("Presale Cons: {}".format(cons[k])) 
                            if(prod[j] <= 0 and cons[k] >= 0): 
                                prod1 = prod[j] 
                                if(abs(prod[j]) < cons[k]): 
                                    traded = prod[j] 
                                    price = price_selllist[j] 
                                    cons[k] = cons[k] + prod[j] 
                                    prod[j] = 0 
                                    price_selllist[j] = 1000 
                                    print("Prod: {}".format(prod[j])) 
                                    print("Cons: {}".format(cons[k])) 
                                    print("kW Traded: {}".format(traded)) 
                                    print("Price of Trade: {}".format(price)) 
                                    print("\n") 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=13).value = 
x+1 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=14).value = 
prod[j] 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=15).value = 
cons[k] 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=16).value = 
traded 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=17).value = 
price 
                                    z = z+1 
                                else: 
                                    traded = cons[k]*-1 
                                    price = trade_price 
                                    prod[j] = prod[j]+cons[k] 
93 
 
                                    cons[k] = 0 
                                    price_buylist[k] = 1000 
                                    price_buylisttemp[k] = 0 
                                    print("Prod: {}".format(prod[j])) 
                                    print("Cons: {}".format(cons[k])) 
                                    print("kW Traded: {}".format(traded)) 
                                    print("Price of Trade: {}".format(price)) 
                                    print("\n") 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=13).value = 
x+1 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=14).value = 
prod[j] 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=15).value = 
cons[k] 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=16).value = 
traded 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=17).value = 
price 
                                    z = z+1 
                        else: 
                            trade = 0 
                r+=1 
        print("\n") 
        print("Remaining Prod: {}".format(prod)) 
        print("Remaining Cons: {}".format(cons)) 
        print("Remaining NET: {}".format(sum(prod)+sum(cons))) 
        sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=18).value = sum(prod)+sum(cons) 
                     
        sale = True 
 
        print("\n") 
wb2.save("NET LOAD.xlsx")   
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C.3. Simulation Code for Grid-Connected Operation – Model II 
 
import hashlib as hasher 
import datetime as date 
import math 
import random 
import numpy as np 
from openpyxl import load_workbook 





# DATA HANDLING 
# 




ws1 = wb2["Sheet2"] 
ws2 = wb2["Sheet3"] 
sheet = wb2.active 





Load1 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load1.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=2).value)) 





Load2 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load2.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=3).value)) 





Load3 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load3.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=4).value)) 





Load4 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load4.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=5).value)) 







Load5 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load5.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=6).value)) 





Load6 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load6.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=7).value)) 





Load7 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load7.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=8).value)) 





Load8 = [] 
for x in range(3,27): 
    Load8.append((ws1.cell(row=x,column=9).value)) 






# GLOBAL CONSTANTS & COUNTERS 
# 
 
blockchain = [create_genesis_block()] 
previous_block = blockchain[0] 
Cbat = 30 
Csh = 500 
Cres = 63 
Ckw = 25 
Cl = 80 
Cpk = 63 
Ppk = 1 
Pbat = 0.3 
Pmaxline = 1 
Ccurt = 800 
Cgrid = [26.84, 24.63, 21.21, 20.32, 20.14, 21.10, 24.62, 29.62, 31.94, 
37.54, 42.26, 48.08, 52.71, 59.98, 62.62, 62.99, 67.50, 64.72, 57.09, 50.41, 
47.77, 40.96, 36.71, 32.12] 
 
t=1 




fp_buy = 5 
fp_sell = 25 
m=1 
n=1 
num_of_blocks_to_add = 24 
 
for x in range(len(Load1)): 
 
        print("\nHour # {}\n".format(x+1)) 
        traders = [] 
        prod = [] 
        cons = [] 
        traders.append(Load1[x]) 
        traders.append(Load2[x]) 
        traders.append(Load3[x]) 
        traders.append(Load4[x]) 
        traders.append(Load5[x]) 
        traders.append(Load6[x]) 
        traders.append(Load7[x]) 
        traders.append(Load8[x]) 
 
        for i in range(len(traders)): 
            if(traders[i] < 0): 
                prod.append(traders[i]) 
            elif(traders[i] > 0): 
                cons.append(traders[i]) 
        print(prod) 
        print(cons) 
        alpha = 0 
        price_buy = 8 
        price_sell = 25 
        r = 1 
        q=1 
        fixed_buylist=[] 
        price_buylist=[] 
        fixed_selllist = [] 
        price_selllist = [] 
 
        while(sum(prod) != 0 and sum(cons) != 0): 
            r=1 
            q=1 
            j=0 
            k=0 
            trade = 0 
            while(sum(prod) != 0 and sum(cons) !=0): 
                j=0 
                for j in range(len(prod)): 
                    sale = False 
                    if(abs(prod[j])<sum(cons)): 
                        beta = 1 
                    else: 
                        beta = 0 
                    if(abs(prod[j])>sum(cons)): 
                        gamma = 1 
                    else: 
                        gamma = 0 
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                    if(r <= 100): 
                        if(r==1): 
                            fixed_sell = (1 + 
((abs(prod[j])**(1/2))/3))*Cgrid[x] 
                            fixed_selllist.append(fixed_sell) 
                            price_sell = fixed_sell 
                            print("Fixed_seller price: 
{}".format(round(fixed_sell, 4))) 
                            price_selllist.append(price_sell) 
                            print("Seller price: {}".format(round(price_sell, 
4))) 
                        else: 
                            price_sell = price_selllist[j] - 
(price_selllist[j]*0.05*(abs(prod[j])) + Cbat*0.1*abs(prod[j])) 
                            price_selllist[j] = price_sell 
                            print("Seller price: 
{}".format(round(price_selllist[j], 4))) 
                             
                 
                for k in range(len(cons)): 
                        if(abs(sum(prod))<cons[k] or cons[k]>0.5): 
                            alpha = 1 
                        else: 
                            alpha = 0 
                        if(r <= 100): 
                            if(r==1): 
                                fixed_buy = (1 - 
((abs(cons[k])**(1/2))/3))*Cgrid[x] 
                                fixed_buylist.append(fixed_buy) 
                                print("Fixed_buyer price: 
{}".format(round(fixed_buylist[k],4))) 
                                price_buy = fixed_buylist[k] + 
fixed_buy*(cons[k]*0.05) 
                                price_buylist.append(price_buy) 
                                print("Buyer price: 
{}".format(round(price_buylist[k], 4)))   
                            else: 
                                price_buy = price_buylist[k] + 
((Cpk*0.05*cons[k] + Csh*0.01*(cons[k]-0.05*cons[k]))) 
                                price_buylist[k] = price_buy 
                                print("Buyer price: 
{}".format(round(price_buylist[k], 4))) 
                 
                trade_price = min(price_selllist) 
                count = 0 
                #while(count <= 5): 
                for k in range(len(price_buylist)): 
                        count += 1 
                   
                        while(price_buylist[k] > trade_price): 
                            trade_price = min(price_selllist) 
                            j = price_selllist.index(min(price_selllist)) 
                            if(price_buylist[k] > trade_price and (prod[j] < 
0 and cons[k] > 0)): 
                             
                                print("\nPresale Prod: {}".format(prod[j])) 
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                                print("Presale Cons: {}".format(cons[k])) 
                                 
                                if(prod[j] < 0 and cons[k] > 0): 
                                     
                                    if(abs(prod[j]) < cons[k]): 
                                        traded = prod[j] 
                                        price = price_selllist[j] 
                                        cons[k] = cons[k] + prod[j] 
                                        prod1 = prod[j] 
                                        pricesell1 = price_selllist[j] 
                                        prod[j] = 0 
                                        price_selllist[j] = 1000 
                                        print("Prod: {}".format(prod[j])) 
                                        print("Cons: {}".format(cons[k])) 
                                        print("kW Traded: {}".format(traded)) 
                                        print("Price of Trade: 
{}".format(price)) 
                                        print("\n") 
                                        sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=13).value 
= x+1 
                                        sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=14).value 
= round(prod[j], 5) 
                                        sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=15).value 
= round(cons[k], 5) 
                                        sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=16).value 
= round(traded, 5) 
                                        sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=17).value 
= round(price, 5) 
                                        z = z+1 
                                    else: 
                                        traded = cons[k]*-1 
                                        price = trade_price 
                                        prod[j] = prod[j]+cons[k] 
                                        cons[k] = 0 
                                        #price_buylist[k] = 1000 
                                        price_buylist[k] = 0 
                                        print("Prod: {}".format(prod[j])) 
                                        print("Cons: {}".format(cons[k])) 
                                        print("kW Traded: {}".format(traded)) 
                                        print("Price of Trade: 
{}".format(price)) 
                                        print("\n") 
                                        sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=13).value 
= x+1 
                                        sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=14).value 
= round(prod[j], 5) 
                                        sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=15).value 
= round(cons[k], 5) 
                                        sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=16).value 
= round(traded, 5) 
                                        sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=17).value 
= round(price, 5) 
                                        z = z+1 
 
                            elif(sum(prod) == 0 and cons[k] > 0): 
                                p = abs((abs(prod1)-cons[k])/prod1) 
                                p_res = p*abs(prod1) 
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                                tempseller = Cres 
                                p_resalt = 0.2*prod1 
                                if((20*price_buylist[k])>tempseller): 
                                    traded = min(p_res, p_resalt) 
                                    traded = traded*-1 
                                    price = tempseller 
                                    cons[k] = cons[k] + traded 
                                    prod1 = 0 
                                    #price_selllist[j] = 1000 
                                    print("Prod: {}".format(prod[j])) 
                                    print("Cons: {}".format(cons[k])) 
                                    print("kW Traded: {}".format(traded)) 
                                    print("Price of Trade: {}".format(price)) 
                                    print("Traded @ 2nd price") 
                                    print("Z: {}".format(p)) 
                                    print("\n") 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=13).value = 
x+1 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=14).value = 
round(prod[j], 5) 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=15).value = 
round(cons[k], 5) 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=16).value = 
round(traded, 5) 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=17).value = 
round(price, 5) 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=18).value = 1 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=20).value = 
trade_price 
                                    sheet.cell(row=z+1, column=21).value = 
p_res 
                                    z = z+1 
                            else: 
                                trade = 0 







C.4. Simulation Code for Blockchain Settlement Protocol 




import datetime as date 
from openpyxl import Workbook 
import time 
import numpy as np 
 
filename = "consensus_16.xlsx" 
workbook = Workbook() 




  def __init__(self, index, timestamp, data, previous_hash): 
    self.index = index 
    self.timestamp = timestamp 
    self.data = data 
    self.previous_hash = previous_hash 
    self.hash = self.hash_block() 
   
  def hash_block(self): 
      sha = hasher.sha256() 
      sha.update((str(self.index) + str(self.timestamp) + str(self.data) + 
str(self.previous_hash)).encode()) 
      return sha.hexdigest() 
 
def create_genesis_block(): 
  # Manually construct a block with 
  # index zero and arbitrary previous hash 
  return Block(0, date.datetime.now(), "Genesis Block", "0") 
 
def next_block(last_block): 
  this_index = last_block.index + 1 
  this_timestamp = date.datetime.now() 
  this_data = "kW:" + str(pnet) + " Price:" + str(0) + " Time:" +nowtime 
  this_hash = last_block.hash 
  return Block(this_index, this_timestamp, this_data, this_hash) 
 
class Prosumer(): 
    def __init__(self, index, pgen, pload, pnet, status): 
        self.index = index 
        self.pgen = pgen 
        self.pload = pload 
        self.pnet = pnet 
        self.status = status 
 
    def vote(self): 
        return 1 
 
    def value(self): 
        val = random.uniform(0,10) 




# Create the blockchain and add the genesis block 
blockchain = [create_genesis_block()] 
previous_block = blockchain[0] 
temp_buyer = [] 





# How many blocks should we add to the chain 
# after the genesis block 




pgensum = 0 
ploadsum = 0 
while(y < num_of_blocks_to_add): 
    prosumers = list() 
    producers = list() 
    consumers = list() 
    for k in range(1, 8): 
        pgen = round(random.uniform(5,15), 2) 
        pload = round(random.uniform(5,15), 2) 
        pnet = round(pload-pgen, 2) 
        if(pgen > pload): 
            status = 1 
        else: 
            status = 0 
        prosumers.append(Prosumer(k, pgen, pload, pnet, status)) 
 
#Negotiate contract 
    have_contract = 0 
    f = 2 
    prepare = 0 
    commit = 0 
    values = list() 
    messages = 0 
    nowtime = date.datetime.now().strftime('%S.%f')[:-2] 
    sheet.cell(row=y+1, column=8).value = nowtime 
 
    #pBFT 
    while(prepare <= (2*f +1)): 
        for i in range(0, len(prosumers)): 
            prepare += prosumers[i].vote() 
            time.sleep(random.uniform(0, 0.1)) 
            messages += 1 
 
    while(commit <= (2*f +1)): 
        for i in range(0, len(prosumers)): 
            commit += prosumers[i].vote() 
            time.sleep(random.uniform(0,0.1)) 
            messages += 1 
 
    #Modified PoS 
    for i in range(0, len(prosumers)): 
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        values.append(prosumers[i].value()) 
    validator = np.argmax(values) 
 
    nowtime = date.datetime.now().strftime('%S.%f')[:-2] 
    block_to_add = next_block(previous_block) 
    blockchain.append(block_to_add) 
    previous_block = block_to_add 
    print("Block #{} has been added to the 
blockchain!".format(block_to_add.index)) 
    print("Data: {}".format(block_to_add.data)) 
    print("Hash: {}\n".format(block_to_add.hash)) 
    sheet.cell(row=y+1, column=3).value = block_to_add.index 
    sheet.cell(row=y+1, column=4).value = block_to_add.data 
    sheet.cell(row=y+1, column=5).value = block_to_add.hash 
    sheet.cell(row=y+1, column=6).value = nowtime 
    sheet.cell(row=y+1, column=7).value = messages 
 






C.5. Optimal Scheduling Problem Code 
 
{string}T=...;   //time horizon 
{string}G={"G1"};    //Thermal generating units 
float L[T]=...;  //net load data 
float F[G]=[61.3];  //operational cost ($/MW) 
float Pmin[G]=[0.01]; //minimum power generation 
float Pmax[G]=[.5];  //max power generation 
float SU[G]=[15];  //startup for each uniit 
float SD[G]=[2];  //shutdown for each unit 
float Eessmin= 2;  //Minimum energy capacity (MWh) 
float Eessmax= 10;  //Maximum energy Capacity  (MWh) 
float Pdchmax=0.3;  //max discharging power for the battery 
float Pdchmin=0.01;  //min discharging power for the battery 
float Pchmin=0.01;   //min charging power for the battery 
float Pchmax=0.3;   //max charging power for the battery 
float CB=70; 
float CC=1000; 
float Cgrid[T] = [26.84, 24.63, 21.21, 20.32, 20.14, 21.10, 24.62, 29.62, 
31.94, 37.54, 42.26, 48.08, 52.71, 59.98, 62.62, 62.99, 67.50, 64.72, 57.09, 




//float SU[G]=[18,10,15];//startup for each uniit 
//float SD[G]=[1.5, 1, 2];//shutdown for each unit 
 
// DECISION variables 
//dvar float Pgrid[T]; 
dvar float+ P[G][T];  //generation from microgrid 
dvar float R[T]; // Spining Reserve 
dvar float Bss[T]; // battery Power 
dvar float C[T]; // Battery Energy  
dvar float Pnet[T]; 
dvar boolean u[G][T];//commitment state of dispatchable units 
dvar boolean y[G][T];// startup variable 
dvar boolean z[G][T];//shut down variable 
dvar boolean d1[T]; // DISCHARGING STATE VARIABLE 
dvar boolean c1[T]; // CHARGING STATE VARIABLE 
 
//objective function 
dexpr float cost = sum(j in T)(sum (i in G) (F[i]*P[i][j]*u[i][j] + 






subject to { 
// Power balance constraint 
CT1: forall (i in G, j in T){ 
(sum(i in G)P[i][j]+Bss[j]+R[j]+Pnet[j]==L[j]);}  
 
//generation limits 
CT2:forall(i in G,j in T){ 
   Pmin[i]*u[i][j]<=P[i][j];} 
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CT3: forall (i in G, j in T){ 
            L[j]<=Pmax[i]=>Pmax[i]*u[i][j]>=P[i][j]; 
   L[j]>=Pmax[i]=>Pmax[i]*u[i][j]>=P[i][j];} 
    
CT5:forall(i in G, j in T:j!=first(T)){ 
   y[i][j]-z[i][j]==u[i][j]-u[i][prev(T,j)];} 
    
CT6:forall (i in G, j in T){ 
            y[i][j]+z[i][j]<=1;}  
             
//Battery limits 
//max discharge and min charge of MG1 
CT7:forall (j in T){ 
   Bss[j]<=((Pdchmax*d1[j])-(Pchmin*c1[j]));} 
    
//min discharge and max charge of MG1 
CT8: forall (j in T){ 
   Bss[j]>=((Pdchmin*d1[j])-(Pchmax*c1[j]));} 
    
//charging and discharging state of ESS for MG1   
CT9: forall (j in T){ 
   d1[j]+c1[j]<=1;} 
    
//ESS state of charge for MG1 
CT10:forall (j in T:j!=first(T)){ 
   C[j]==C[prev(T, j)]-Bss[j];} 
    
//ESS capacity constraints for MG1 
CT11:forall(j in T){ 
   C[j]<=Eessmax; 
   C[j]>=Eessmin;} 
    
CT12: forall(j in T){ 
   abs(R[j]) <= 0.5;} 
}  
